{"id":4273,"date":"2015-01-30T12:33:42","date_gmt":"2015-01-30T12:33:42","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.africlub.net\/awdf\/?p=4273"},"modified":"2015-08-14T10:55:48","modified_gmt":"2015-08-14T10:55:48","slug":"drawing-in-the-dragon-chinas-involvement-in-africas-peace-security-by-semiha-abdulmelik","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/awdf.org\/OldSite\/drawing-in-the-dragon-chinas-involvement-in-africas-peace-security-by-semiha-abdulmelik\/","title":{"rendered":"Drawing in the Dragon: China\u2019s Involvement in Africa\u2019s Peace & Security by Semiha Abdulmelik"},"content":{"rendered":"

Semiha Abdulmelik is one of the two women AWDF sponsored for the African Leadership Centre’s \u00a0Peace and Security Fellowship for African Women. To learn more about Semiha click here<\/a>. This article was cross-posted from Strife<\/a><\/em>\u00a0and the African Leadership Centre<\/a>.<\/i><\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/span><\/p>\n

29th January 2015<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

\u2018Meaningful participation in African conflict-resolution processes is not an important aspect of China\u2019s current Africa relations. China is becoming increasingly important in the landscape of African politics, including in conflict-affected theatres, but is not as significant an actor as external perceptions contend. Nor has the Chinese government shown any particular inclination for more active engagement beyond spheres such as Sudan where the need is more compelling\u2019\u2019.[1]<\/span><\/p>\n

Dan Large (SOAS), 2008, in China\u2019s role in the mediation and resolution of conflict in Africa.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

These words, written just seven years ago, now seem out of date. We are now witnessing what might be described as a significant if incremental evolution in China\u2019s involvement in Africa\u2019s peace and security. It is more structured, purposeful, and beyond countries of immediate interest, if still exploratory.<\/span><\/p>\n

China\u2019s peace and security engagement on the continent has predominantly been characterised as driven by economic interests in countries in which it has significant investments. This is the narrative most commonly seen in the Western media and academia: strict adherence to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of countries and comprising of bi-lateral military cooperation and arms trade. How this has evolved will be the focus of this piece.<\/span><\/p>\n

With China\u2019s increasing focus on its global power and the associated reputational risks, as well as the emerging realities of its deepening political engagement in Africa, a number of defining shifts can be observed. China\u2019s concerted efforts to resolve the South Sudanese conflict is a case in point. China has dispatched its Special Representative for African Affairs, Zhong Jianhua, to conduct shuttle diplomacy, support the Inter-governmental Authority on Development\u2019s (IGAD) efforts, and create forums for dialogue between the parties.[2] He noted that China\u2019s meeting with South Sudanese opposition was \u2018pretty dramatic for us. I think for the last two or three decades we were quite rigid about non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries\u2026 this is a typical domestic conflict. Usually when this happens, we try to avoid making direct contact with the opposition because, to some extent we think, it\u2019s a rebel force. When you talk to a rebel force that means stepping into internal affairs.\u2019 [3]<\/span><\/p>\n

But Chinese mediation efforts in South Sudan suggest that China is reconsidering its long-standing belief in ership Cennon-interference as part of its commitment to support peace and security in Africa.[4] This change comes from an understanding that it is essential for the achievement of its development policy and goals in Africa that there be peace and security.<\/span><\/p>\n

Interestingly, Jiahua was also clear that China did not have the academic or analytical expertise to understand internal African conflicts.[5] Indeed, China\u2019s approach has been less about a nuanced understanding of the conflict dynamics but a kind of \u2018oil diplomacy\u2019 grounded in its ability to appeal to the economic rationale and incentives of the warring parties.[6] In this regard, the Chinese government is currently promoting African Studies[7i] in its academic and research institutions \u2013 pointing to the growing importance of non-state (academic\/research) linkages between China and Africa in mediating and informing this growing engagement.[8]<\/span><\/p>\n

In contrast to Sudan and South Sudan, where China has a significant economic presence, and hence more evident engagement in conflict mediation efforts, there are other parts of Africa where China does not have the same immediate interests yet is still involved in fostering peace and security. In Mali, China has contributed over 500 military troops to the UN peacekeeping mission (a quarter of its total UN troop contributions).[9] This is significant because China does not often deploy military personnel; previously it had only deployed logistical and medical personnel.[10] Interestingly, given the lack of significant Chinese interests in the country, Chinese efforts appear more in pursuit of broader regional stability where it has varied interests.<\/span><\/p>\n

This attention to China\u2019s role in UN peacekeeping in Africa suggests that China is now placing greater emphasis on multilateral approaches to peace and security partnerships in Africa. While this has often been seen by Chinese commentators and others following Chinese foreign policy[11] as an attempt by China to consolidate its ascendancy as a global power, this involvement has arguably been \u2018evolving in an open-ended way\u2019.[12] China has, for instance, proven more progressive in supporting the use of force to protect civilians in through the UN mission in the DRC while at the same time continuing its traditional resistance to the establishment of a human rights office for the UN mission in Sudan.[13]<\/span><\/p>\n

China\u2019s increasingly multilateral approach to peace and security cooperation in Africa is not only through the UN but also through regional organizations \u2013 the African Union (AU) in particular. The admission of the African Union Commission in October 2011 as a full member of the Forum of China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) has undoubtedly paved the way from more concrete cooperation in the area of peace and security between China and the African Union (AU).<\/span><\/p>\n

Three years later, the Government of China and the AU co-launched the AU-China Strategic Dialogue for Peace and Security in Africa.[14] This regional multilateral cooperation is predicated on two pillars. Firstly, financial and technical support for various aspects of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), including AU peace support operations and mechanisms such as the African Standby Force and African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises. Secondly, cooperation at an international level, particularly on African positions at the UN Security Council and on UN Security Council reform.<\/span><\/p>\n

Chris Alden, one of the few writers to analyse China\u2019s multilateral engagement with the African Union on peace and security issues, argues that China\u2019s desire for more systematic and institutionalized cooperation on peace and security in Africa is in tension with Chinese foreign policy principles and economic interests. This is particularly so given the underlying normative basis for APSA, namely the principle of non-indifference and provision for intervention in Member States.[15] As such, he sees three emerging ways in which China could engage with the APSA, all of which it already exhibits to varying degrees: as architects (through the formulation of new or refinement of existing foreign policy and security norms); builders (through participation in multilateral security and peacekeeping operations); and\/or as subcontractors (through offering specific and time-bound solutions for security challenges) of the APSA.[16]<\/span><\/p>\n

It is clear that China\u2019s engagement in Africa\u2019s peace and security has evolved, both with regards to its principles of engagement, geographic scope, and institutional interlocutors. As Alden\u2019s exploratory research has indicated, there will continue to be interest \u2013 and a research agenda \u2013 in seeing how this evolves further and consolidates in the long-term with regards to Chinese foreign policy. Of further interest will be how this plays out in international efforts to secure peace and security in Africa, from possible tensions or cooperation between the West \u2013 Africa\u2019s traditional peace and security partner \u2013 and China, to UN Security Council level reforms. Yet what is missing and crucial is African perspectives and experiences: this should preoccupy the new generation of African academics and researchers.<\/span><\/p>\n

Semiha Abdulmelik is currently a Fellow at the African Leadership Centre in Kenya. Her research interests include humanitarian diplomacy, regional organizations, post-conflict reconstruction, and the security dynamics of the Horn. You can follow her on Twitter at @SAbdulmelik.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

NOTES<\/span><\/p>\n

[1] Large, D. (2008), China\u2019s role in the mediation and resolution of conflict in Africa, Oslo Forum Network of Mediators, accessed at http:\/\/www.hdcentre.org\/uploads\/tx_news\/20DanLargeChinainAfricaWEB.pdf, pp. 35-41. China\u2019s significant resource interests in Sudan, including its substantial economic investment, presence of nationals and oil operations and facilities, particularly in Darfur, has put the Sudan conflict and its resolution as a top interest for the Chinese government.<\/span><\/p>\n

[2] China to hold consultative conference on South Sudan in Khartoum, Sudan Tribune, January 6, 2015 accessed at http:\/\/www.sudantribune.com\/spip.php?article53569<\/span><\/p>\n

[3] Fabricius, P. (2014), China plays mediator in Africa, The Sunday Independent, November 2, 2014, accessed at http:\/\/www.iol.co.za\/sundayindependent\/china-plays-peacemaker-in-africa-1.1774195#.VK0zOyuUcT8<\/span><\/p>\n

[4] Indeed, Chinese officials have been quick to point to the Chinese commitment during the 2012 Forum of China-African Cooperation (FOCAC) to do more in the area of peace and security in Africa.<\/span><\/p>\n

[5] Ibid<\/span><\/p>\n

[6] Fabricius, P. (2014). In Fabricius\u2019s interview with him, Jiahua admits that that he does not know the triggers for the South Sudanese civil war or who is to blame. Instead the approach has been to reiterate what was conveyed to both parties when oil production was shut down in 2012. \u201cI persuaded them that this is the most important property not only of the government but also of the people of South Sudan. Look at this country; the biggest, the most important for the survival of the people is this oilfield. For some like Large (2008) however, this is an indication to a lesser degree of China\u2019s lack of experience in \u2018applied conflict resolution\u2019 and more a demonstration of China engaging on \u2018its own terms for its own ends\u2019.<\/span><\/p>\n

[7] Ibid<\/span><\/p>\n

[8] China-Africa scholarly exchanges and fora are not new. These are long-standing and have historical links to state-sponsored efforts to support communist Africa states. However, this was largely focused on technical areas such as agriculture and engineering. This concerted state effort to strengthen China\u2019s knowledge and analytical capacity in the area of Africa\u2019s peace and security, as well as non-state efforts to build linkages between Chinese and African researchers and institutions, such as Fahamu\u2019s Emerging Powers Programme, are indicative of shifts that respond to current realities in the China-Africa relationship.<\/span><\/p>\n

[9] http:\/\/www.un.org\/en\/peacekeeping\/resources\/statistics\/contributors.shtml<\/span><\/p>\n

[10] Cordano, D. (2014), China\u2019s role in Africa\u2019s conflicts: Military cooperation, arms transfers and involvement in peacekeeping operations, 11 April, Consultancy Africa Intelligence, accessed at http:\/\/www.consultancyafrica.com\/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1672:chinas-role-in-africas-conflicts-military-cooperation-arms-transfers-and-involvement-in-peacekeeping-operations&catid=60:conflict-terrorism-discussion-papers&Itemid=265<\/span><\/p>\n

[11] Wong, C. (2013), China Embraces Peacekeeping Missions, The Diplomat, August 9, accessed at http:\/\/thediplomat.com\/2013\/08\/china-embraces-peacekeeping-missions\/<\/span><\/p>\n

[12] Fabricius, P. (2014),<\/span><\/p>\n

[13] Cordano, D. (2014)<\/span><\/p>\n

[14] http:\/\/www.peaceau.org\/en\/article\/commissioner-chergui-concludes-official-visit-to-china-launches-au-china-strategic-dialogue-for-peace-and-security-in-africa<\/span><\/p>\n

[15] Alden, C. (2014), China\u2019s evolving approach to the African Peace and Security Architecture, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, accessed at http:\/\/www.saiia.org.za\/news\/chinas-evolving-approach-to-the-african-peace-and-security-architecture<\/span><\/p>\n

[16] Ibid<\/span><\/p>\n

Semiha Abdulmelik est l’une des deux femmes d’AWDF parrain\u00e9e pour la paix et la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 par\u00a0la bourse du Centre africain pour le leaderschip des femmes africaines. Pour en savoir plus sur Semiha cliquez ici.<\/a> Cet article a \u00e9t\u00e9 publi\u00e9 pour\u00a0Strife et le Centre de leadership africain.<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

29th Janvier 2015<\/em><\/p>\n

“La participation significative dans les processus de r\u00e9solution des conflits africains n’est pas un aspect important des relations actuelles de la Chine en Afrique. La Chine est de plus en plus importante dans le paysage de la politique africaine, y compris dans les r\u00e9gions th\u00e9\u00e2tre de\u00a0conflits, mais pas un acteur aussi important que le soutiennent les perceptions externes . Le gouvernement chinois n’a pas non plus montr\u00e9 d’inclination particuli\u00e8re pour un engagement plus actif au-del\u00e0 des domaines tels que le Soudan, o\u00f9 le besoin est le plus convaincant<\/em> ”. [1]<\/p>\n

Dan Large (SOAS), 2008, dans le r\u00f4le de la Chine dans la m\u00e9diation et la r\u00e9solution des conflits en Afrique.<\/p>\n

Ces mots, \u00e9crits il y a seulement sept ans, semblent aujourd’hui d\u00e9pass\u00e9s. Nous assistons aujourd’hui \u00e0 ce qui pourrait \u00eatre d\u00e9crit comme une \u00e9volution incr\u00e9mentale si importante dans l’implication de la Chine dans la paix et la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l’Afrique. Elle\u00a0est plus structur\u00e9e, d\u00e9termin\u00e9e, et au-del\u00e0 des pays d’int\u00e9r\u00eat imm\u00e9diat, elle est encore exploratoire.<\/p>\n

L’engagement de la Chine sur le continent pour la paix et la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 a surtout \u00e9t\u00e9 caract\u00e9ris\u00e9 comme dict\u00e9e par des int\u00e9r\u00eats \u00e9conomiques dans les pays dans lesquels elle a des investissements importants. Ceci est le r\u00e9cit le plus souvent vu dans les m\u00e9dias occidentaux et le monde universitaire: le strict respect du principe de non-ing\u00e9rence dans les affaires int\u00e9rieures des pays et comprenant de la coop\u00e9ration militaire et le commerce des armes bi-lat\u00e9rale. Comment a \u00e9volu\u00e9 cela sera le th\u00e8me de ce papier.<\/p>\n

Avec l’augmentation de l’accent de la Chine sur sa puissance mondiale et les risques de r\u00e9putation associ\u00e9s, ainsi que les nouvelles r\u00e9alit\u00e9s de l’approfondissement de son engagement politique en Afrique, un certain nombre de changements peuvent \u00eatre observ\u00e9s. Les efforts concert\u00e9s de la Chine pour r\u00e9soudre le conflit du Sud-Soudan est un cas d’\u00e9cole. La Chine a envoy\u00e9 son repr\u00e9sentant sp\u00e9cial pour les affaires africaines, Zhong Jianhua, de faire\u00a0la navette diplomatique, soutenir l’Autorit\u00e9 intergouvernementale pour les efforts de d\u00e9veloppement(IGAD), et cr\u00e9er des espaces de dialogue entre les parties. [2] Il a not\u00e9 que la r\u00e9union de la Chine avec l’opposition au Sud-soudan \u00e9tait \u00abassez dramatique pour nous. Je pense que pour les deux ou trois derni\u00e8res d\u00e9cennies, nous \u00e9tions assez rigide sur la non-ing\u00e9rence dans les affaires int\u00e9rieures des autres pays … ceci est un conflit interne typique. Habituellement, lorsque cela se produit, nous essayons d’\u00e9viter tout contact direct avec l’opposition parce que, dans une certaine mesure, nous pensons, il est une force rebelle. Lorsque vous parlez \u00e0 une force rebelle qui implique une intervention dans les affaires int\u00e9rieures<\/em> \u00bb. [3]<\/p>\n

Mais les efforts de m\u00e9diation chinois au Soudan du Sud sugg\u00e8rent que la Chine est en train de reconsid\u00e9rer sa conviction de longue date dans le partenariat Cennon-ing\u00e9rence dans le cadre de son engagement \u00e0 soutenir la paix et la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 en Afrique. [4] Ce changement provient d’une compr\u00e9hension qui\u00a0est essentielle pour la r\u00e9alisation de sa politique et ses objectifs de d\u00e9veloppement en Afrique afin qu’il y ait la paix et la s\u00e9curit\u00e9.<\/p>\n

Fait int\u00e9ressant, pour Jiahua \u00e9tait \u00e9galement clair que la Chine n’a pas l’expertise acad\u00e9mique ou analytique pour comprendre les conflits africains internes. [5] En effet, l’approche de la Chine a \u00e9t\u00e9 moins sur une compr\u00e9hension nuanc\u00e9e de la dynamique du conflit, que sur\u00a0une sorte de \u00abdiplomatie p\u00e9troli\u00e8re\u00bb fond\u00e9e sur sa capacit\u00e9 de faire appel \u00e0 la logique \u00e9conomique et les incitations des parties bellig\u00e9rantes [6] \u00c0 cet \u00e9gard, le gouvernement chinois est en train de promouvoir des \u00e9tudes africaines [7i] dans ses institutions universitaires et de recherche -. soulignant l’importance croissante de non-\u00e9tatique ( universitaire \/ recherche) les liens entre la Chine et l’Afrique dans la m\u00e9diation et de l’informer d’un engagement croissant. [8]<\/p>\n

En revanche au Soudan et au Sud-Soudan, o\u00f9 la Chine a une pr\u00e9sence \u00e9conomique importante, et l’engagement donc plus \u00e9vident dans les efforts de m\u00e9diation des conflits, il y a d’autres parties de l’Afrique o\u00f9 la Chine n’a pas les m\u00eames int\u00e9r\u00eats imm\u00e9diats et\u00a0est toujours impliqu\u00e9 dans la promotion de la paix et de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 . Au Mali, la Chine a contribu\u00e9 avec plus de 500 troupes militaires \u00e0 la mission de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies (un quart du total des contributions en troupes de l’ONU) [9] Ceci est important parce que la Chine ne d\u00e9ploie pas souvent le personnel militaire. Auparavant, elle\u00a0avait seulement d\u00e9ploy\u00e9 du personnel logistique et m\u00e9dical. [10] Il est int\u00e9ressant, \u00e9tant donn\u00e9 le manque d’int\u00e9r\u00eat chinois pour\u00a0le pays, les efforts chinois semblent plus \u00e0 la poursuite de la stabilit\u00e9 r\u00e9gionale plus large o\u00f9 il a vari\u00e9 ses int\u00e9r\u00eats.<\/p>\n

Cette attention au r\u00f4le de la Chine dans le maintien de la paix des Nations Unies en Afrique sugg\u00e8re que la Chine met d\u00e9sormais davantage l’accent sur les approches multilat\u00e9rales, les partenariats de paix et de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 en Afrique. M\u00eame si cela a souvent \u00e9t\u00e9 per\u00e7u par les commentateurs chinois, d’autres suivent la politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re chinoise [11] comme une tentative de la Chine de consolider son emprise comme une puissance mondiale, cette participation a sans doute \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00abl’\u00e9volution d’une mani\u00e8re ouverte\u00bb. [12] La Chine s’est, par exemple, r\u00e9v\u00e9l\u00e9e plus progressive pour soutenir l’utilisation de la force pour prot\u00e9ger les civils en travers de la mission de l’ONU en RDC, tout en continuant en m\u00eame temps sa r\u00e9sistance traditionnelle \u00e0 la cr\u00e9ation d’un bureau des droits de l’homme pour la mission de l’ONU au Soudan. [13]<\/p>\n

L’approche plus multilat\u00e9rale de la Chine \u00e0 la paix et \u00e0 la coop\u00e9ration de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 en Afrique se fait\u00a0non seulement \u00e0 travers l’ONU, mais aussi par les organisations r\u00e9gionales – l’Union africaine (UA) en particulier. L’admission de la Commission de l’Union africaine en Octobre 2011 en tant que membre \u00e0 part enti\u00e8re du Forum sino-africain de coop\u00e9ration (FOCAC) a sans aucun doute ouvert la voie du renforcement de la coop\u00e9ration concr\u00e8te dans le domaine de la paix et la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 entre la Chine et l’Union africaine (UA) .<\/p>\n

Trois ans plus tard, le gouvernement de la Chine et de l’UA ont co-lanc\u00e9 le Dialogue strat\u00e9gique de l’UA-Chine pour la paix et la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 en Afrique. [14] Cette coop\u00e9ration multilat\u00e9rale r\u00e9gionale repose sur deux piliers. Tout d’abord, le soutien financier et technique pour les divers aspects de la paix et la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l’Afrique de l’Architecture (APSA), y compris les op\u00e9rations de l’UA de maintien de la paix et des m\u00e9canismes tels que la Force africaine en attente et des capacit\u00e9s en Afrique pour une r\u00e9ponse imm\u00e9diate aux situations de crise. Deuxi\u00e8mement, la coop\u00e9ration au niveau international, en particulier sur les positions de l’Afrique au Conseil de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l’ONU et sur la r\u00e9forme du Conseil de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l’ONU.<\/p>\n

Chris Alden, un des rares \u00e9crivains \u00e0 analyser l’engagement multilat\u00e9ral de la Chine avec l’Union africaine sur les questions de paix et de s\u00e9curit\u00e9, fait valoir que le d\u00e9sir de la Chine d’une coop\u00e9ration plus syst\u00e9matique et institutionnalis\u00e9e sur la paix et la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 en Afrique est en tension avec les principes de la politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re chinoise et les int\u00e9r\u00eats \u00e9conomiques . Cela est particuli\u00e8rement vrai \u00e9tant donn\u00e9 la base normative sous-jacente de l’APSA, \u00e0 savoir le principe de non-indiff\u00e9rence et la fourniture d’une intervention dans les \u00c9tats membres. [15] En tant que tel, il voit trois mani\u00e8res \u00e9mergents dans lesquels la Chine pourrait engager avec l’APSA, qui tous il pr\u00e9sente d\u00e9j\u00e0 \u00e0 des degr\u00e9s divers: les architectes (gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 la formulation de la nouvelle ou le perfectionnement de la politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re et les normes de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 existantes); constructeurs (\u00e0 travers la participation \u00e0 des op\u00e9rations multilat\u00e9rales de maintien de la paix et de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9); et \/ ou en tant que sous-traitants (par le biais de l’offre de solutions sp\u00e9cifiques et limit\u00e9s dans le temps pour les d\u00e9fis de s\u00e9curit\u00e9) de l’APSA. [16]<\/p>\n

Il est clair que l’engagement de la Chine dans la paix et la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l’Afrique a \u00e9volu\u00e9, tant au niveau de ses principes d’engagement, sa port\u00e9e g\u00e9ographique, et des interlocuteurs institutionnels. Comme la recherche exploratoire d’Alden l’a indiqu\u00e9, il y aura toujours des int\u00e9r\u00eats – et un programme de recherche – \u00e0 voir comment cela \u00e9volue encore et se consolide dans le long terme en ce qui concerne la politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re chinoise. De plus l’int\u00e9r\u00eat sera de savoir comment cela se joue dans les efforts internationaux pour assurer la paix et la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 en Afrique, \u00e0 partir de possibles tensions ou de la coop\u00e9ration entre\u00a0l’Occident – partenaire traditionnel pour la paix et la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l’Afrique – et la Chine, qui \u00e0 des r\u00e9formes au niveau du Conseil de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 des Nations unies. Pourtant, ce qui manque et qui est crucial ce sont des perspectives et des exp\u00e9riences africaines: cela devrait pr\u00e9occuper la nouvelle g\u00e9n\u00e9ration d’universitaires et chercheurs africains.<\/p>\n

Semiha Abdulmelik est actuellement chercheur au Centre de leadership africain au Kenya. Ses int\u00e9r\u00eats de recherche portent sur la diplomatie humanitaire, les organisations r\u00e9gionales, la reconstruction post-conflit, et la dynamique de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de la Corne. Vous pouvez la suivre sur Twitter \u00e0SAbdulmelik.<\/em><\/p>\n

NOTES<\/p>\n

[1] Large, D. (2008), le r\u00f4le de la Chine dans la m\u00e9diation et la r\u00e9solution des conflits en Afrique, Forum d’Oslo r\u00e9seau de m\u00e9diateurs, accessible \u00e0 http:\/\/www.hdcentre.org\/uploads\/tx_news\/20DanLargeChinainAfricaWEB.pdf, pp . 35-41. Importantes ressources int\u00e9r\u00eats de la Chine au Soudan, y compris son investissement \u00e9conomique important, la pr\u00e9sence des ressortissants et des op\u00e9rations de p\u00e9trole et des installations, en particulier au Darfour, a mis le conflit du Soudan et sa r\u00e9solution comme un int\u00e9r\u00eat sup\u00e9rieur pour le gouvernement chinois.<\/p>\n

[2] La Chine tiendra une conf\u00e9rence consultative sur le Sud-Soudan \u00e0 Khartoum, Sudan Tribune 6 Janvier 2015 consult\u00e9e au http:\/\/www.sudantribune.com\/spip.php?article53569<\/p>\n

[3] Fabricius, P. (2014), la Chine joue un m\u00e9diateur en Afrique, Le Sunday Independent, le 2 Novembre 2014, consult\u00e9e au http:\/\/www.iol.co.za\/sundayindependent\/china-plays-peacemaker-in- africa-1.1774195 # .VK0zOyuUcT8<\/p>\n

[4] En effet, les autorit\u00e9s chinoises ont \u00e9t\u00e9 prompts \u00e0 souligner l’engagement chinois lors du Forum 2012 de la Chine-Afrique de coop\u00e9ration (FOCAC) de faire davantage dans le domaine de la paix et la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 en Afrique.<\/p>\n

[5] Ibid<\/p>\n

[6] Fabricius, P. (2014). Dans l’interview avec Fabricius, Jiahua admet que ce qu’il ne conna\u00eet pas les \u00e9l\u00e9ments d\u00e9clencheurs de la guerre civile soudanaise du Sud ou qui est \u00e0 bl\u00e2mer. Au lieu de cela l’approche a \u00e9t\u00e9 de r\u00e9it\u00e9rer ce qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 transmis aux deux parties lors de la production de p\u00e9trole qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 ferm\u00e9e en 2012. \u00abJe les ai persuad\u00e9 que c’est la propri\u00e9t\u00e9 la plus importante non seulement du gouvernement mais aussi du peuple du Sud-Soudan. Regardez ce pays; le plus grand, le plus important pour la survie du peuple est ce champ p\u00e9trolif\u00e8re. Pour certains, comme Grand (2008) Toutefois, cela est une indication \u00e0 un degr\u00e9 moindre, du manque d’exp\u00e9rience de la Chine appliqu\u00e9e la r\u00e9solution des conflits \u00bbet plus une d\u00e9monstration de la Chine sur les\u00ab engageant ses propres termes pour ses propres fins \u00bb.<\/p>\n

[7] Ibid<\/p>\n

[8] les \u00e9changes et les forums scientifiques sino-africains ne sont pas nouveaux. Il se font\u00a0de longue date et ont des liens historiques avec les efforts parrain\u00e9s par l’\u00c9tat pour soutenir les communistes Afrique \u00c9tats. Toutefois, cela est en grande partie ax\u00e9es sur les domaines techniques tels que l’agriculture et de l’ing\u00e9nierie. Cet effort de l’Etat concert\u00e9 pour renforcer la Chine connaissances et la capacit\u00e9 d’analyse dans le domaine de la paix et la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l’Afrique, ainsi que les efforts de non-\u00c9tat pour construire des liens entre les chercheurs et les institutions chinoises et africaines, tels que le Programme puissances \u00e9mergentes Fahamu, sont r\u00e9v\u00e9lateurs de changements qui r\u00e9pondre aux r\u00e9alit\u00e9s actuelles de la relation Chine-Afrique.<\/p>\n

[9] http:\/\/www.un.org\/en\/peacekeeping\/resources\/statistics\/contributors.shtml<\/p>\n

[10] Cordano, D. (2014), le r\u00f4le de la Chine dans les conflits en Afrique: la coop\u00e9ration militaire, les transferts d’armes et participation \u00e0 des op\u00e9rations de maintien de la paix, le 11 Avril, Consultance Africa Intelligence, accessible \u00e0 http:\/\/www.consultancyafrica.com\/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1672:chinas-role-in-africas-conflicts-military-cooperation-arms-transfers-and-involvement-in-peacekeeping-operations&catid=60:conflict-terrorism-discussion-papers&Itemid=265<\/p>\n

[11] Wong, C. (2013), la Chine embrasse les missions de maintien de la paix, le diplomate, le 9 ao\u00fbt, consult\u00e9e au http:\/\/thediplomat.com\/2013\/08\/china-embraces-peacekeeping-missions\/<\/p>\n

[12] Fabricius, P. (2014),<\/p>\n

[13] Cordano, D. (2014)<\/p>\n

[14] http:\/\/www.peaceau.org\/en\/article\/commissioner-chergui-concludes-official-visit-to-china-launches-au-china-strategic-dialogue-for-peace-and-security-in-africa<\/p>\n

[15] Alden, C. (2014), l’approche \u00e9volutive de la Chine \u00e0 l’architecture africaine de paix et de s\u00e9curit\u00e9, Centre norv\u00e9gien des ressources consolidation de la paix, accessible \u00e0 http:\/\/www.saiia.org.za\/news\/chinas-evolving-approach-to -les-africain de la paix et la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 \u00e0 l’architecture<\/p>\n

[16] Ibid<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Semiha Abdulmelik est l’une des deux femmes d’AWDF parrain\u00e9e pour la paix et la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 par\u00a0la bourse du Centre africain pour le leaderschip des femmes africaines. Pour en savoir plus sur Semiha cliquez ici. Cet article a \u00e9t\u00e9 publi\u00e9 pour\u00a0Strife et le Centre de leadership africain. 29th Janvier 2015 “La participation significative dans les processus […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":7,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[7],"tags":[413,414,424,418,421,425,423],"class_list":["post-4273","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-blog","tag-abdulmelik","tag-african-leadership-centre","tag-china","tag-governance","tag-peace","tag-peace-and-security","tag-semiha"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nDrawing in the Dragon: China\u2019s Involvement in Africa\u2019s Peace & Security by Semiha Abdulmelik - The African Women's Development Fund (AWDF)<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/awdf.org\/OldSite\/drawing-in-the-dragon-chinas-involvement-in-africas-peace-security-by-semiha-abdulmelik\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Drawing in the Dragon: China\u2019s Involvement in Africa\u2019s Peace & Security by Semiha Abdulmelik - The African Women's Development Fund (AWDF)\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Semiha Abdulmelik est l’une des deux femmes d’AWDF parrain\u00e9e pour la paix et la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 par\u00a0la bourse du Centre africain pour le leaderschip des femmes africaines. 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