



AFRICAN
WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT
FUND

FUTURES AFRICA

TRENDS FOR WOMEN BY 2030



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Street address:

Justice Sarkodie Addo Avenue
East Legon, Accra, Ghana

Post:

P.M.B CT 89 Cantonments, Accra, Ghana

www.awdf.org

Lead researcher and writer:

Katindi Sivi-Njonjo, Longview Consult

Editor:

Jessica Horn

Contributing editors:

Theo Sowa, Akwaeke Emezi, Madonna Kendona

Copy editing:

Akwaeke Emezi

Design and layout:

KEYMOTIV Designs

Photography:

Sarah Waiswa

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAI	Africa America Institute
AFDB	African Development Bank Group
AGDI	African Gender and Development Index
ASMR	Age-Standardised Mortality Rate
AWDF	African Women's Development Fund
CBK	Central Bank of Kenya
CCP-AU	Centre for Citizens' Participation in the African Union
CEDAW	Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
COHRE	Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
CVD	Cardiovascular Disease
DALYS	Disability-Adjusted Life Years
DFID	Department for International Development
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	East African Community
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECD	Early Childhood Education programmes
ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EY	Ernst and Young
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FLFP	Female Labour Force Participation
FLFPR	Female Labour Force Participation Rate
FPE	Free Primary Education
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GER	Gross Enrolment Rate
GIR	Gross Intake Rate
GNP	Gross National Product
HDR	Human Development Report
IDA	Institute for Defence Analyses
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPU	Inter-Parliamentary Union
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
KNBS	Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
LFP	Labour Force Participation
LFPR	Labour Force Participation Rate
MFSP	Mobile Phone Financial Service Provider
MMR	Maternal Mortality Rates
NCD	Non-Communicable Diseases
NER	Net Enrolment Rate
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
PRB	Population Reference Bureau
RTI	Road Traffic Injuries
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SMS	Short Messaging Services
SRHR	Sexual Reproductive Health Rights
SSA	Sub-Saharan African
SSCR	Secondary School Completion Rate
STI'S	Sexually Transmitted Infections
UN-HABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
WHO	World Health Organization

FOREWORD

This report is the result of an intentional experiment. As we sat down at AWDF to decide how to organise our process for the development of our most recent strategic plan, we asked ourselves some challenging questions. We are committed to investing in women's agency and leadership to make better futures for the African continent—and yet, in our planning across donor and women's rights sectors, we tend to reflect backwards, learning from past approaches while considering past or present priorities. Although this is important, we wondered if we were in fact obscuring the very thing we are working to change—the course of the future.

We began to discuss a process that raised questions about the future instead, ways to map out where Africa is headed and, using this, to consider what possible futures await—futures we want to make happen, but also scenarios that we would work to avoid. We asked—what insight would this future provide around where to invest resources and actions, now and over the next ten to fifteen years? What can it tell us about priorities to consider if we want this future to be fully just for women?

We were excited to work with Katindi Sivi-Njonjo, one of the few African women foresight practitioners, in writing this future trends analysis report, and guiding AWDF staff and partners in a creative scenario-building process to imagine what Africa could look like for women and women's rights in 2030. Both of these tools in turn formed the basis for AWDF's new strategic framework *Shaping the Future*.

This document offers a trends analysis around what the data says about Africa's future and the place of women and girls in the arenas we identified as key drivers affecting our futures: the economy, governance, demographics, health, education, and technology. It draws on existing data produced by governmental agencies and research institutions.

What is evident in reading it is that the focus and language of the data itself reveals assumptions, priorities, and sometimes even biases around what is important to track for policy and planning. In the field of health, for example, data assesses family planning access but does not necessarily provide the same quality or consistency of information around informed consent or degree of women's access to user-controlled contraception, which are critical reproductive rights concerns. With economic data, there is a common assumption that GDP growth in itself will lead to better development and rights outcomes at population level.

From our vantage point as an African women's fund, we see across the continent that the lever of change for the majority is not just growth in the overall economy but how that growth is distributed and what mechanisms exist for its redistribution to support the most marginalised. Indeed, a number of recent reports have pointed to economic growth in some countries as a factor that fuels inequality and economic disparity. We are also aware that most national economic data does not make visible the tremendous contribution that African women make to national economies, given that this labour is often in the informal sector and/or in the private sphere.

Data based on only a partial acceptance and analysis of the true nature of contributions to an economy not only distorts understandings of how economic growth happens, it distorts perceptions of the roles and value of women in the economic and social spheres.

There is an underlying heteronormativity around the makeup of families in particular, as well as the assumption that there are only two genders—which, as both historical reflection on the diversity of gender in Africa as well as contemporary transgender activism have shown, is not in fact the case. Lastly, the data also tends to separate sub-Saharan Africa from North Africa (with North Africa more commonly grouped with the Middle East), making statistical analyses of the continent as a whole more difficult.

All of these issues point to the political nature of how data is collected and framed, and also to the need for African women’s rights analysts and activists to be more involved in the process of defining and generating the data that we need for our work and planning.

The data that does exist, however, should force us to rethink. By 2030, people on the African continent will represent a fifth of humanity. Almost half of these people will reside in urban areas, with the slum population doubling. The continent is both growing older as people live longer, but also increasingly youthful as our demographics change. By 2030, just over a third of all Africans will be under the age of 15.

Infectious diseases that historically cut short the lives of Africans will now give way to non-communicable diseases—cancers, diabetes, and respiratory conditions exacerbated by polluted environments, changes in nutrition, and more sedentary lifestyles—which will become the leading causes of death.

African economies are expected to increase with overall growth, yet persistent questions about equity remain. The reach of mobile technology will continue to expand, increasing possibilities for access to information and to financial and other mobile services. We know that all of these trends are gendered—even if the existing data does not always reflect this.

We hope that this document is useful in informing debates around our individual and collective strategies and priorities, providing early warnings, and also pointing to untapped potential in advancing African women’s rights. To complement the data here, we have added ‘Feminist Questions’ throughout the document, intended to spark discussions around the implications of the numbers for our planning and action, and to encourage action on filling the data gaps and considering the politics of the formulation of questions and the data collected.

This is the beginning of a process of integrating foresight into the work of AWDF. We are alive to the fact that there is more to research, more questions to ask, and more thinking to be done. As part of our commitment to Shaping Africa’s Future, we will be publishing ongoing analysis of emerging issues, raising questions about missing data, and considering the implications for where donors invest and what issues we work on in activism and feminist movement building.

We look forward to this collaborative thinking and to exciting dialogues.

Theo Sowa, CEO - AWDF

Jessica Horn, Director of Programmes - AWDF



01.

INTRODUCTION



1.1 Background

The African Women's Development Fund (AWDF) is a grant making foundation that supports local, national, and regional women's organisations, working towards the empowerment of African women and the promotion and realisation of their rights. Since 2001, the AWDF has been working for, by, and with African women to promote, support, and amplify African women's organising through funding, capacity building, knowledge production, and advocacy; to change the narrative around African women.

As part of its commitment to investing in African women's rights, AWDF felt it important to consider what lies ahead for African women—to look to the future—and begin to shape an organisational Strategic Framework as well as thematic strategies that work towards shaping a future with full rights, equality, and justice. As a first step, it is crucial to understand how various trends around gender dynamics have been evolving in the past and the present, and what those patterns portend for the future. AWDF would also like to know what new trends are emerging and how they will impact women and their rights in the future. This work therefore seeks to explore the future for Africa over the next 10-15 years and to question what that exploration implies for women and for women's rights.

There are focuses on variables around the following: social parameters such as demographics, health, education; economic parameters such as labour trends and earnings, economic opportunities, poverty and inequality; political parameters such as political representation, access to justice and violence against women; and technological issues such as mobile technology use and social media impact.

Futures Africa: Trends for Women by 2030 is a baseline document collating these trends to establish the issues that will pose the greatest challenge to women's rights in Africa in the future, and to determine what other emerging areas will impact women's rights and impede their empowerment. Through this work, AWDF will also have a basis for extrapolating future prospects that are helpful in framing the future possible outcomes and options for women's rights concerns.

1.2 Data collection, analysis and limitations

The material in this book is collated from various secondary sources that are certified as credible. Since all these reports use different data collection methodologies, the author has sufficiently referenced the work for further reading. The facts are presented in charts, graphs, and tables, highlighting simple observations but also giving future implications of the trends for women and women's rights in Africa.

The study is limited by the lack of detailed up-to-date data consistently collected over time to enable us to model future trends that would allow for more in-depth analysis and cross-referencing of data in order to make inferences. The feminist questions provided in each section, however, offer opportunities for more discussions around data gaps and other possible analyses.

According to Overseas Development Institute (ODI, 2015), issues of most concern to women are poorly covered by existing data. More so, Africa has the weakest data collection and the highest data gaps compared to other regions in the globe. Due to this, some regions like North Africa have not been included in all the variables—with the result that certain conclusions in the document refer only to Sub Saharan Africa, as opposed to the entire African region.



A note on language

Statistical research still tends to use biological sex classifications ('female/male') rather than the social terminology of gender ('women'/men'). This is a concern for feminists, as the biological concept of female does not always equate to the social category of woman. Feminist researchers continue to highlight this flaw in data collection and analysis. We have used, where possible, the social language of gender—however we are limited in our ability to change terminology used in primary data.



02.

SOCIAL TRENDS



2.1 Demographics

Population parameters such as growth or decline, structure and distribution across different age groups at any given point in time are deemed important because they have a significant impact on people's quality of life and the socio-economic development of a country (NCPD, 2013). Looking in broad view towards 2030, the African continent is heading towards a significantly larger population, with both a majority youth population but also a growing ageing population in need of care and economic support.

2.1.1 Proportion of men to women

The proportion of men and women refers to the composition of a population as determined by the number of males and females. This is measured by sex ratios.

Understanding sex ratios is important because it impacts issues of gender equality, the future of labour markets, marriage, and family formation.

The ratio of men to women in Africa is currently 50:50. However, by 2030, the population of women is projected to slightly decrease, although the proportion of both men and women will more or less remain the same¹.

East (33% of women in Africa) and West Africa (30% of women in Africa) regions currently have the highest proportion of women in the continent. The total population of women in Africa is expected to increase by 2030, with women in East and West Africa representing 65% of African women by that year. East Africa is also the only region expected to have more women than men in 2030, as evidenced in Table 1.

TABLE 1: THE PROPORTION OF MEN TO WOMEN

REGION & SUB-REGION	Sex Ratio (men/100 women) 1995	1995 (millions)		Sex Ratio (men/100 women) 2015	2015 (millions)		% of the continent's women in 2015	Sex Ratio (men/100 women) 2030	2030 (millions)		% of the continent's women in 2030
		M	F		M	F			M	F	
World	101.3	2,887	2,848	101.8	3,707	3,642		101.6	4,284	4,217	
Africa	99.6	359	361	100.1	593	593		100.5	842	837	
Sub-Saharan Africa	99.1	280	283	100	481	481		100.5	700	697	
North Africa	101.3	79	78	100.8	112	111	19	100.7	142	141	17
West Africa	101.1	104	103	102	178	175	30	102.5	261	255	30
East Africa	98.1	112	114	98.9	196	198	33	99.2	288	290	35
Central Africa	100	42	42	100	76	76	13	100	116	116	14
Southern Africa	99	23	24	101.1	31	32	5	100	35	35	4

Source: UN World Population Prospects, 2015

¹The data does not point to a social or political reason for this difference.

²Comprises of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, Western Sahara

³Comprises of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo

⁴Comprises of Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Seychelles, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe

⁵Comprises of Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe.

⁶Comprises of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland

2.1.2 Population structure / distribution

The age structure of a population is the distribution of various age groups in the population. Understanding the age structure is important because people's economic behaviour and needs vary at different stages of life. Changes in the age structure of a country therefore have significant effects on its economic performance (Bloom, 2003), as well as social dynamics. Age structures are influenced by parameters such as fertility, mortality, and migration (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2011).

Most of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is undergoing a demographic transition, owing to declining infant mortality—from 90 children per 1000 dying in 1995 to 59 per 1000 in 2015, and declining fertility rates—from 5.8 children born per woman in 1995 to 4.7 children in 2015 (see Table 2). It is projected that infant mortality rates will decline to 42 children per 1000 and fertility rates will further decline to 3.9 children per woman in sub-Saharan Africa by 2030.

The highest decline is expected to occur in Central and West Africa. The declining trend has various implications including: decrease in overall annual population growth rate; increase in

TABLE 2: TRENDS IN FERTILITY AND MORTALITY RATES

REGION	Total fertility rate (1995)	Total fertility rate (2015)	Total fertility rate (2030)	Infant mortality rate (1995)	Infant mortality rate (2015)	Infant mortality rate (2030)
World	3.1	2.5	2.4	62	37	26
Africa	5.8	4.7	3.9	90	59	42
Sub-Saharan Africa	6.2	5	4.1	95	64	45
North Africa	4.4	3.4	2.8	63	29	21
West Africa	6.4	5.4	4.6	86	64	48
East Africa	6.4	4.8	3.9	106	52	42
Central Africa	6.3	6.1	4.6	107	96	58
Southern Africa	4.2	2.7	2.2	49	36	28

Source: UN World Population Prospects, 2015

Decrease in overall annual population growth rate:

A first effect of declining fertility and mortality rates is a reduction in Africa's overall annual population growth rate (from 2.3% in 2012 to 2% by 2030).

North Africa's population growth rate will slow the most, with a decline to 0.8 % by 2030 (African Development Bank [AfDB], 2012), as shown in Table 3.

However, this trend can change. Rates of decline can be disrupted by a slowing GDP per capita, by an epidemic like HIV/AIDS—as was the case in the past, or by sustained lack of access to family planning and full reproductive choice.

TABLE 3: AFRICA POPULATION GROWTH RATES BY SUB-REGIONS

Africa and its Sub-Regions	Growth Rate by Sub-Region		
	1990	2012	2030
Africa	2.6	2.3	2
North Africa	2.2	1.9	0.8
West Africa	2.6	2.5	2.3
East Africa	2.8	2.5	2.1
Central Africa	3.3	2.5	2
Southern Africa	2.5	1.9	1.7

Source: AfDB, 2012 based on UN Population Division data

Increase in population:

Sustained population growth results from mortality rates falling more than fertility rates (AfDB, 2014). Although Africa's fertility and population growth rates have been declining (as shown in Tables 2 and 3), Africa's population has been growing as a proportion of the world's population: from representing 13% of the world in 1995 to 16%⁷ in 2015 (see Table 4).

This trend will continue to 2030, when Africa is expected to make up 19% of the global population. This means that by 2030, roughly one in every five people in the world will live on the African continent. Populations of East and West Africa will grow especially rapidly, making up 65% of Africa's total population by 2030.

TABLE 4: AFRICAN POPULATION PROJECTIONS

Area	Population In Millions			
	1995	2015	2030	2050
World	5,702	7,336	8,505	9,804
Africa	720	1,171	1,658	2,473
% of Africa's population to the world	13	16	19	25
Sub-Saharan Africa	586	949	1,369	2,081
North Africa	162	222	289	392
West Africa	199	349	509	784
East Africa	226	388	562	841
Central Africa	83	149	229	378
Southern Africa	50	63	69	77

Source: Population Reference Bureau, 1995 and 2015

⁷According to the UN, 2015 World population prospect, 60% i.e. 4.4 billion people in 2015 live in Asia; 10% i.e. 738 million live in Europe; 9% i.e. 634 million lived in Latin America and the Caribbean; 5% i.e. 358 million lived in North America; while 39 million people lived in Oceania. China (1.4 billion) and India (1.3 billion) remain the 2 largest countries of the world, both with more than 1 billion people, representing 19 and 18 per cent of the world's population.

⁸The African Youth Charter defines youth or young people as every person between the ages of 15 and 35 years.

Altering of the age composition:

A third effect of declining mortality and fertility rates is the change on the age composition of the population. Between 2015 and 2030, the phenomenon will lead to a decreasing proportion of children (0-14 years) by 4% despite an increase in the actual child population by 29%.

Although the proportion of youth (15 – 35 years)⁸ will not be altered between 2015 and 2030, the youth population will increase by 43% due to the numbers of children that will transition into that age group. This means that the African continent will house the highest proportion of youth on the globe by 2030. The increase in the number of youth will in turn surge the proportion of the working age population.

The population of young people in Africa will continue to grow, making Africa an increasingly youthful continent. Looking at SSA, the median age in 2015 was 18.5 years (UNDP, 2015) compared to the global median age, which was 30.2 years old. In 2030, Africa's median age is projected to be 21 years (Worldometer, n.d.).

The working age population (i.e. 15 – 64 year olds) has already begun to rise (Lam & Leibbrandt, 2013) and will increase by 103% by 2030 to make up 58 % of Africa's total population (see Appendix A).

Alongside growing numbers of young people, there is also an increase in the number of elderly people in Africa. Although the proportion of the aged population (65+) will only increase by 1% to form 4% of the total population in 2030, the actual number of old people living in Africa will increase by 66 %.

Table 5 below shows past and future demographic trends, which indicate the growth already underway in the working age population as well as those above 65 years.

TABLE 5: TRENDS IN POPULATION DISTRIBUTION

REGION	% of pop below 15 years (1995)	% of pop below 15 years (2015)	Pop (Mill) below 15 years (2015)	% of pop below 15 years (2030)	Pop (Mill) below 15 years (2030)	% of pop btw 15 and 64 (1995)	% of pop btw 15 and 64 (2015)	Pop (Mill) btw 15 and 64 years (2015)	% of pop btw 15 and 64 (2030)	Pop (Mill) btw 15 and 64 (2030)	% of pop over 65 (1995)	% of pop over 65 (2015)	Pop (Mill) over 65 (2015)	% of pop over 65 (2030)	Pop (Mill) over 65 (2030)
World	32	26	1907.4			62	66	4841.8			6	8	586.8		
Africa	45	41	480.11	37	626.76	52	55	644.1	58	983.47	3	4	46.8	4	68.9
Sub-Saharan Africa	46	43	408.07			51	54	512.46			3	3	28.47		
North Africa	41	31	68.82			56	64	142.08			3	5	11.1		
West Africa	46	43	150.07			51	54	209.5			3	3	10.47		
East Africa	47	43	166.84			50	54	209.5			3	3	11.64		
Central Africa	46	46	68.58			51	51	75.99			3	3	4.47		
Southern Africa	38	31	19.53			58	64	40.3			4	5	3.15		

Source: Population Reference Bureau, 1995 and 2015

⁸The African Youth Charter defines youth or young people as every person between the ages of 15 and 35 years.

The shifting age composition of communities has several potential effects, including creating greater demand and competition for jobs, altering childcare and elderly care work (both roles still carried out mainly by women across the African continent), and posing new issues for the health sector, particularly around the health concerns of the elderly.

Increase in life expectancy:

A fourth effect of lowered fertility and mortality rates is improved life expectancy. Within this, women consistently have higher life expectancies than their male counterparts. Looking back, life expectancy across Africa has already been increasing, with the exception of Southern Africa where life expectancy decreased between 1995 and 2015 due to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. This increase is set to continue. **It is projected that by 2030, average life expectancy in Africa will reach 64 years, compared to 55 years in 1995** (see Table 6). The drivers of longer life are “projected better incomes, access to improved water supply and sanitation, and better health facilities” (International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2015).

As Table 6 below shows, this improvement varies across regions. North Africa and East Africa are projected to have the highest life expectancies, with 76 to 64 years respectively against 56 years in Central Africa. Southern Africa is the exception as mentioned above, and life expectancy there is not expected to return to the levels it was at in the 1990s—before the impact of AIDS—until after the year 2030.

TABLE 6: LIFE EXPECTANCY IN AFRICA (1995–2030)

AREA	Life expectancy at birth (1995)			Life expectancy at birth (2015)			Projected life expectancy (2030)
	Both Sexes	Male	Female	Both Sexes	Male	Female	
World	66	64	68	71	69	73	-
Africa	55	53	56	60	58	61	64
Sub-Saharan Africa	52	51	54	57	56	59	-
North Africa	64	63	65	71	69	72	76
West Africa	53	52	55	55	54	56	61
East Africa	50	48	52	61	59	63	64
Central Africa	49	47	51	52	50	54	56
Southern Africa	65	62	67	61	59	63	61

Source: Population Reference Bureau, 1995 and 2015; and AfDB, 2012 based on UN Population Division data (for the projections)

HOW WILL AFRICA HARNESS THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF ITS YOUNG PEOPLE?

The age composition of a country's population is an important factor for development policy making (AfDB, 2012). The trends show Africa becoming an increasingly youthful continent. Conventional wisdom suggests that if countries in Africa manage the demographic transition wisely—by providing good education, health and good job opportunities for the rapidly growing working age population—then a window of opportunity will open up (referred to as the demographic dividend).

Demographic dividends have in the past led to faster economic growth partly because of increased numbers of economically productive people and decreased dependency ratios. However, equitable distribution of this wealth is vital for improved human development especially of the dependent segment (Ross, 2004). Looking beyond economics, it is also important to consider what an increasingly youthful population contributes to Africa socially, culturally, and politically; and how to encourage and harness this potential for innovation, dynamism, and positive change.



FEMINIST QUESTIONS

- As African women move towards bearing fewer children, how does this affect the portion of women's time devoted to unpaid care in the family? What possibilities do this open up regarding women's time for paid economic activity, for greater political inclusion, and for rest?
- As family planning interventions expand, to what extent are women's rights to choice and informed consent factored into family planning policy, services, and reproductive technology design and access? How can this be increased?
- Women are already positioned in a more vulnerable position in labour markets, including in lower paying, informal, and precarious work. As the population of women of working age expands, what interventions can be made to increase women's opportunities for participation in more protected, profitable labour?
- With increasing likelihood of women in Africa living until older age and past formal retirement, what policies need to be introduced or strengthened around social protection, including non-civil service pensions and support for elderly women? How are such policies designed to strengthen African traditions of intergenerational care, while enabling greater independence without increasing isolation, particularly for older carers?
- What role can both social norm change and policy play in increasing men's role as carers and sharing childcare and reproductive labour?
- As we approach the reality of a majority young continent, how do we nurture the creative potential and imagination of young people, towards contributing to Africa's advancement?
- What initiatives are needed to make formal governance and decision-making more representative of the age and gender demographics of the continent?

2.2 Urbanisation and migration

Statistically, urbanisation reflects an increasing proportion of the population living in settlements defined as urban, primarily through net rural to urban migration. According to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2013), international migration is the component of population change that is most difficult to measure and estimate reliably going into the future, as it is dependent on a range of other factors.

For migration from Africa to other global regions, for example, we could project that the proportion of migrants is likely to increase from Africa due to declining numbers of the working age population in developed countries, and increase in the working age population in Africa able to take on jobs in other countries.

However, the interest and ability of Africans to migrate for work outside of Africa is also dependent on socio-economic, political, and environmental factors that are themselves subject to a great deal of volatility.

2.2.1 Urbanisation in Africa

While Africa is the least urbanised continent in the world, it is experiencing the highest urban growth and the most rapid rate of urbanisation (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2013; UNECA, 2014) outpacing other regions in the globe (AfDB, 2012). As shown in Table 7, only 27% of the population was urban in 1995. By 2015, 38% of the population was living in urban areas—an increase of 11% in 20 years.

TABLE 7: URBANISATION IN AFRICA (1995–2030)

AREA	1995 Population density (persons /Km ²)	% Urban (1995)	2015 Population density (persons /Km ²)	% Urban (2015)	2030 Population density (persons /Km ²)	% Urban (2030)
World	44.1	43	56.5	53	65.3	
Africa	24.3	31	40	40	56.6	49.9
Sub-Saharan Africa	25.7	27	44	38	63.8	
North Africa	20.3	45	28.8	51	36.4	60.5
West Africa	34	23	58.2	45	85.1	57
East Africa	33.8	21	59.2	24	86.8	33.3
Central Africa	12.9	37.2 (2010)	23.4	46	35.7	55.9
Southern Africa	17.9	50	23.6	59	26.5	68.3

Source: Population Reference Bureau, 1995 and 2015; UN World Population Prospects, 2015; and Bocquier, P. and Mukandila, A.K., (2011 December).

Although urban growth rates have been declining over the years (from 1995-2000, it was 3.9%; from 2010-2015, it was 3.6%) and are projected to continue declining in the future (from 2015-2030, urban growth rate is projected to be 3.3%; (Jacobsen, Webster, & Vairavamorthy, 2012), Africa's urban areas grew 1.7 times faster than the urban growth rate of the world in the same years (UNECA, 2014).

It is expected that **by 2030, almost half of Africa's population will be living in urban areas**—representing around 654 million people. According to the African Development Bank, several African cities such as Dar es Salaam, Nairobi⁹, and Addis Ababa in East Africa are now and will continue to be among the fastest-growing in the world (see Table 8).

⁹Governance decisions can also affect the rate of urban growth. For example in Kenya, devolution put in place under the 2010 constitution has increased economic opportunities in counties outside of Nairobi and with this has also increased migration to county headquarter towns. This is likely to have an impact on the growth rate of Nairobi, as people have greater choice of urban centres to migrate to in search of work or to establish businesses.

However, from the projections, East Africa will be the least urban—mainly because other cities within Kenya, Tanzania, and Ethiopia as well as countries in the region (notably Burundi [19.8%] and Uganda [20.6%]; Bocquier & Mukandila, 2011) will be urbanising at a much slower rate, thus slowing down the cumulative average growth rate of the region. Southern and North Africa will be the most urban regions by 2030 (see Table 7).

The reasons for increased urbanisation include an increase in rural-urban migration, natural population growth of youthful and working age populations, as well as the spatial reclassification of urban areas.

TABLE 8: AFRICAN CITIES THAT WILL GROW BY MORE THAN 50% BY 2025

CITY	Country	Projected % change in growth (2010 – 2025)
Dar es Salaam	Tanzania	85.2
Nairobi	Kenya	77.3
Kinshasa	Congo	71.8
Luanda	Angola	69.3
Addis Ababa	Ethiopia	62.4
Abidjan	Cotê d'Ivoire	53.2
Dakar	Senegal	51.5

Source: AfDB, 2014

2.2.2 The growth of slums

Due to poor planning, African cities are not currently designed or equipped to accommodate such rapid population increases. As such, urbanisation in Africa has brought about the proliferation of slums. As Table 9 indicates, 61.7% of people living in urban areas are slum dwellers. **By 2030, the slum population is projected to almost double** (ODI, 2015).

TABLE 9: PROPORTION OF URBAN POPULATION LIVING IN SLUMS (1990 – 2012)

Major region or area	1990	1995	2000	2005	2007	2010	2012
Proportion of urban population							
North Africa	48.5	50.0	51.2	52.4	53.0	54.0	54.6
Sub-Saharan Africa	28.3	30.6	32.7	34.9	35.8	37.2	38.2
Sub-Saharan Africa	28.3	30.6	32.7	34.9	35.8	37.2	38.2
Proportion of slum population							
North Africa	34.4	28.3	20.3	13.4	13.4	13.3	13.3
sub-Saharan Africa	70.0	67.6	65.0	63.0	62.4	61.7	61.7

Source: State of the World's Cities, 2012-13

2.2.3 Migration of women

Because of limited possibilities for advancement in their home continent, nearly a third (28%) of African women with university degrees currently migrate out of Africa in search of suitable job opportunities. This is in contrast with only 17% of educated men (EY, 2011).

Patterns of internal and external migration and its implications for women

The mixed social impact of internal urban migration for women: Internal migration will be driven by rapid urbanisation and widening inequality between rural and urban areas, causing more vulnerable populations of young people or rural women to move to urban areas in search of a better life. Internal migration will also be driven by environmental factors such as drought or floods due to climate change, because of dependence on agriculture where most women work (National Intelligence Council, 2012).

This trend is cyclical, as urbanisation and its resulting environmental impact in turn exacerbate climate change. The social implications for women are mixed. On the one hand, urban migration may see women lose their rural familial support systems. On the other hand, this distance can create a greater sense of autonomy for women. In urban areas, family structures tend to change for migrating women, becoming more nuclear with women earning money themselves and exercising greater control over familial decision making and spending. However, this change towards autonomy is not inevitable, and in many cases, men still retain decision-making power over women's personal and familial resources¹⁰

International migration—both across borders in the continent and outside of Africa—will be driven by better economic opportunities outside of local communities. The increased global mobility of labour and the feminisation of migration¹¹ have made domestic work a globalised profession, with women from poorer countries moving to richer ones in their millions to meet the growing demand for domestic services in recipient countries, and to support their families back home (UN Women, 2011). This poses challenges for African women's rights, as African women migrant workers have historically worked in precarious contexts with little protection from violation in the workplace and as a result of their migrant status. International migration will also be driven by the demand for skilled and unskilled labour from countries whose populations are ageing, and by African women seeking to achieve social as well as economic dreams in contexts which are perceived to offer greater equality and opportunities to women.

The intersection of migration and terrorism has become rife in this decade. Africa—particularly in Nigeria, Somalia, Central African Republic, and South Sudan—has suffered the highest numbers of terrorist fatalities in Africa, resulting in forced migration, especially of women and children to neighbouring countries. Given the multiple crises in parts of Africa driven by political violence, armed conflict, state repression, and increased insurgent terrorism, migration pressure is bound to rise (Schmid, 2016).

¹⁰Susan Forbes Martin, author of 'Women and Migration' quoted by Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, 2008

¹¹74-94% of domestic workers in developed countries are women.

THE GENDERED IMPACT OF INCREASED URBANISATION

Much of the population growth in cities has resulted in rapidly expanding informal settlements, hence unplanned and overcrowded places where people are living in conditions of extreme poverty and deprivation. While these trends generally present daunting challenges for development, they disproportionately affect women.

Limited work opportunities combined with continued discrimination in labour markets contribute to women in slums being vulnerable to taking risky low paying jobs that expose them to exploitation and harassment. Urban poverty entails living in insecure housing that makes women susceptible to physical and emotional harm. Low access to clean water, sanitation, electricity, education, and health care denies them their right to these basic services

IS URBAN AND RURAL PLANNING BENEFITING AFRICAN COMMUNITIES?

Urban poverty is now a permanent feature of most economies. Despite the assumption that urban populations are better off due to access to services, food, education, and jobs—the reality is that the urban poor may in fact face similar if not worse life chances than people in rural areas of their countries (Larsen, 2009).

Against this backdrop of deprivation, however, cities have still played a key role in fuelling economic growth across Africa, generating an estimated 55% of the continent's total GDP in recent years. This is explained by expansion of infrastructure, which allows for more efficient distribution of social services. Urban areas, besides being hubs for non-agricultural high paying jobs, also provide expanded markets for goods and services that expand opportunities for trade.

While cities have contributed around 90% of GDP in highly urbanised developed countries (AfDB, 2012), it is not always the case that they will lead to economic growth—partly due to lack of proper urban planning to optimally harness the benefits of urbanisation.

Urbanisation also has health implications. Studies show that urban living is associated with raised blood pressure and blood sugar, and higher body mass indexes, notably for new urban dwellers, as well as up to four times higher prevalence of diabetes than people in rural areas of the country. Air pollution stemming from industry and motor vehicles also raises the prevalence of respiratory illnesses (Marquez & Farrington, 2013).

For women, increased stress in urban areas combined with changing dietary habits and uptake of smoking all raise cardiovascular risk.

2.3 Women's bodily autonomy, health and rights

Although Africa has made great strides in the health sector, women in Africa bear a disproportionately large share of the global burden of disease and death. African women currently account for more than half of deaths of women worldwide, due to maternal and perinatal conditions, communicable diseases, and nutritional deficiencies. Women's sexual reproductive and health rights (SRHR) are increasingly recognised in laws and guaranteed in constitutions. However, despite often-progressive legislation, there is still a failure to make sexual and reproductive health care available and accessible, resulting in severe restrictions to women's rights and in some cases, serious injury or death (including in the context of unsafe abortion).

2.3.1 Young women's bodily autonomy and health

The life chances of girls and young women are affected by the degree of choice they have in determining both pregnancy and marriage (United Nations Population Fund [UNFPA], 2013). Teen pregnancy and early marriage both have the impact of narrowing opportunities for young women, including around advancing their education, career, and job choices. They also adversely affect health outcomes. Marriage under the age of consent is also a violation of the law and of girls' human rights.

Early and forced marriage: At present in sub-Saharan Africa, four out of 10 women are married before the age of 18 (UNICEF, 2016). The proportion of adolescent girls who are married is nine times that of young men the same age in SSA, 13 times in West and Central Africa and six times in East and Southern Africa (UNFPA, 2013). Young married girls often lack knowledge about sex and the risks of sexually transmitted infections (STI's) and HIV/AIDS, and have weaker negotiating power around sexuality and reproduction, given the steep differential in social power between them and their older partners. Girls and young married women's educational opportunities are also often negatively affected (UNICEF, 2014).

The percentage of women in Africa married before 18 has fallen, with the biggest percentage decreases in North Africa between 1990 and 2015 (UNICEF, 2015). However progress is slow. Child marriage is only projected to fall from 25% of 20 to 24 year-old women who are married before 18 in 2015 to around 22% in 2030 (ODI, 2015). In addition, **due to a high population growth rate in sub-Saharan Africa, the number of women who get married before 18 is expected to increase by 50 % over the next 15 years. In order to end child marriages by 2030, progress would need to be around eight times faster** (ODI, 2015).

TABLE 10: DISTRIBUTION OF ADOLESCENTS' MARITAL STATUS, PERCENTAGE OF LIVE BIRTHS, AND CONTRACEPTIVES IN 2010

Region	Female		Male		% of women currently aged 20-24 who gave birth to live baby by ages 15 or 18, btw 1995-2011			
	Currently married (%) in 2010	Age at first birth before 15	Age at first birth before 18	Adolescent birth rate (ABR) per 1000	Total demand for family planning (%)	Contraceptive prevalence (%)	Unmet need for contraception (%)	
SSA	23.6	2.6			120	37	13	24
East and Southern Africa	19.2	3.1	4	25	112	48	22	26
West and Central Africa	28	2.1	6	28	129	30	7	23


Source: Girls Not Brides, n.d.; UNFPA, 2013

Teenage pregnancies

The vast majority (95%) of the world's births by adolescent mothers (or 98 births per 1,000) occur in Africa, where about 19% of young women become pregnant before age 18 (UNFPA, 2013). One quarter of teenagers aged 15–19 have an unmet need for contraceptives (see Table 10). This lack of access to contraception, often accompanied by a lack of access to comprehensive information about sexuality and reproduction and weak respect for girls and young women's rights to life free from sexual violence, impacts on young African women's ability to participate in education and build knowledge skills needed for adult life.

UNFPA estimates that **towards 2030, sub-Saharan Africa will see the greatest increase in pregnancy globally among adolescent girls under the age of 18**. As shown in Figure 1, this increase would be highest in West and Central Africa, where adolescent pregnancies could increase to 8.9 million in 2030—an increase of 67%. In East and Southern Africa, adolescent

FIGURE 1: NUMBER OF WOMEN AGED 20-24 (MILLIONS) WHO WILL GIVE BIRTH BEFORE AGE 18 FROM 2010 TO 2030



Source: UNFPA, 2013a

Maternal Mortality Rates (MMR)

MMR are on the decline, reducing by 47% in Africa between 1990 and 2013. Still, **projections based on current trends show that maternal mortality rates will still remain high in SSA at 338 deaths per 100,000 live births by 2030**. This is higher than the global projection of 152 deaths per 100,000 live births by the same year (ODI, 2015). While MMR have been lowest in North Africa, the highest decline was in East and North Africa (see Table 11). The decline is credited to declining fertility rates of women (see Table 2) and greater access to contraceptives (see Table 12; AfDB, 2014).

TABLE 11: MATERNAL MORTALITY RATE (MATERNAL DEATHS PER 100 000 LIVE BIRTHS) BETWEEN 1995 AND 2013

Major region or area	1995	2000	2005	2010	2013	% change in MMR between 1990 & 2013	Average annual % change in MMR btw 1990 & 2013
World	360	330	270	230	210	-45	-2.6
sub-Saharan Africa	930	830	680	560	510	-49	-2.9
Africa	840	750	620	510	460	-47	-2.7
East Africa	920	790	630	500	440	-57	-3.6
Central Africa	1100	1100	880	750	680	-38	-2.1
North Africa	130	110	87	74	69	-57	-3.6
Southern Africa	180	200	200	170	160	-22	-1.1
West Africa	950	850	700	590	540	-47	-2.8

Source: State of the World's Cities, 2012-13

Teenage maternal mortality

Research shows that girls who give birth under age 15 are five times more likely to die in childbirth than young women in their early 20s. In addition, 65% of all cases of obstetric fistula occur in girls under the age of 18 (Girls Not Brides, 2017). A further 3.2 million adolescent girls die from unsafe abortions each year – a situation exacerbated by the criminalisation of access to safe abortion in many African countries. Many countries with high levels of early adolescent motherhood are also those with very high maternal mortality ratios.

Contraceptive use

In 2015, Sub-Saharan Africa was using less than half of the world's contraceptive use. However between 1995 and 2015, Sub-Saharan Africa doubled its contraceptive use with the highest improvement being in West and East Africa where use of modern contraceptives tripled (see table 12).

TABLE 12: PERCENTAGE OF MARRIED WOMEN 15-49 USING CONTRACEPTION

AREA	Per cent of Married Women 15-49 Using Contraception (1995)		Per cent of Married Women 15-49 Using Contraception (2015)		Level of improvement	
	All methods	Modern methods	All methods	Modern methods	All methods	Modern methods
World	58	49	62	56	1.1	1.1
Africa	22	17	35	29	1.6	1.7
Sub-Saharan Africa	15	11	30	25	2.0	2.3
North Africa	39	35	51	46	1.3	1.3
West Africa	8	4	16	12	2.0	3.0
East Africa	17	12	41	35	2.4	2.9
Central Africa	-	-	20	10		
Southern Africa	50	48	60	59	1.2	1.2

Source: Population Reference Bureau, 1995 and 2015

Abortion

The regional Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa broke ground in international law by acknowledging women's rights to access safe abortions albeit in limited circumstances. At national level, access to abortion where the life of the woman was in danger and/or in other in specified circumstances is legally permissible in 42 out of 54 African countries (Guttmacher Institute, 2016), yet legislation has not proven to guarantee implementation of policy and provision of services. In addition, many states still criminalise access to safe abortions (African Commission on Human and People's Rights, 2016). In 2014, at least 9% of maternal deaths in Africa were due to unsafe abortions (Guttmacher Institute, 2015).

2.3.2 Communicable diseases

Communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, respiratory diseases, other infections, and parasitic diseases have continued to predominate in the morbidity and mortality statistics. However as shown in Figure 4, those will decrease significantly (by almost half) as causes of death by 2030.

HIV/AIDS however, which has had a disproportionate impact on women, will remain among the three leading causes of burden of disease. African women account for 89% of the cumulative number of years lost due to ill health, disability, or early death attributed to HIV/AIDS globally. In 2009 alone, of all new HIV infections among children worldwide, 91% occurred in the African region. Currently, while HIV infection rates are slowing overall, young African women aged 15-24 continue to be at risk. In 2015, young women accounted for 25% of new infections in Africa (UNAIDS, 2016).

This statistic points to the critical need to address the failure to protect the sexual rights of young women, while also tackling young women’s economic vulnerability which, when combined, fuel risky transactional and inter-generational sex.

As shown in Table 15, **under the optimistic scenario, which also assumes increased prevention activity, HIV/AIDS deaths are projected to drop from 2.1% of Africa’s population to about 1.7 % by 2030** (AfDB, 2011)

TABLE 15: MATERNAL MORTALITY RATE (MATERNAL DEATHS PER 100 000 LIVE BIRTHS) BETWEEN 1995 AND 2013

	2005	2010	2020	2030
High-case scenario	2.27	2.13	1.97	1.77
Low-case scenario	2.27	2.13	1.89	1.71

Source: AfDB, 2014 (Tracking Africa’s progress in figures)

2.3.3 Non-communicable diseases (NCDs)

Although communicable disease remains a concern for Africa as explained above, the burden of disease in Africa is in fact shifting due to expanded prevention and treatment access for HIV/AIDS, malaria, respiratory infections, and other infectious and parasitic diseases. Concurrent lifestyle and environmental changes across the continent are ushering in the rise of non-communicable diseases. The disease burden from NCDs among adults is rapidly increasing in developing countries. Cardiovascular diseases (CVDs) are the first of four main NCDs and account for the most deaths (about 18 million).

Surveys found a hypertension prevalence rate of 25-35% in the adult population aged 25–64 years (World Bank, 2013). This is followed by cancer (8.2 million), chronic lung diseases (4 million), and diabetes (1.5 million; UNDP, 2015). The burden of these diseases is rising disproportionately among lower income countries and populations. Globally, NCDs are killing 38 million people each year. Almost three-quarters of them (28 million) are in low and middle-income countries (UNDP, 2015). According to the World Bank, one quarter of deaths in SSA were caused by NCDs.

Southern Africa had the highest death rates caused by cardiovascular diseases and diabetes in SSA while East Africa had the highest number of deaths caused by cancer. West Africa had the highest number of deaths per 100,000 people caused by chronic respiratory conditions (see Figure 2).

FIGURE 2: ASMR I.E AGES 30-70 YEARS, PER 100 000 POPULATION, IN SSA
BY CAUSE (2008)




Source: World Bank, 2013

The relationship between NCD deaths and age in Africa is important to note (see Figure 3). According to the World Bank, NCDs occur at younger ages in SSA than elsewhere. For example, the average age of death from CVD is at least 10 years younger than in developed countries. Half of the deaths caused by NCDs in Africa occur in people under 70 years of age, while NCDs are already the leading cause of death in people aged over 45 years. Looking from a gendered lens, the NCD death rate among women in Africa is already twice as high as the rate in high-income countries (World Bank, 2013).

Looking to the future, the prevalence of NCDs is rising rapidly and is projected to cause almost three-quarters as many deaths as communicable, maternal, perinatal, and nutritional diseases by 2020—and to exceed them as the most common causes of death by 2030 (WHO, 2011b). While NCD deaths are set to increase globally by a further 17%, the African region represents the largest increase at 27% (World Bank, 2013). As shown in Figure 4, it is projected that the burden of the four NCDs (CVDs, cancer, respiratory diseases, and diabetes) in SSA will almost double between 2008 and 2030. **The share of deaths these NCDs will cause is projected to rise to 46% and to become the leading cause of death in sub-Saharan Africa by 2030 (World Bank, 2011).**


Figure 3: Proportion of NCD Deaths by Age in SSA, 2010



Source: World Bank, 2013

Cardiovascular disease is rising rapidly, while **cancer** is expected to more than double between 2008 and 2030 (World Bank, 2013). Whereas low-income countries showed the lowest prevalence of diabetes (3.8% prevalence), it is expected that by 2030, 28 million people will be affected (World Bank, 2013). **Chronic Respiratory Diseases** are under-recognised, under-diagnosed, and under-treated in SSA, hence there is a scarcity of data around them. However, studies do show that conditions like asthma appear to be on the increase, particularly in urban regions (World Bank, 2013).

FIGURE 4: PROJECTED BURDEN OF DISEASE (% OF TOTAL DALYS¹²) BY GROUPS OF DISORDERS AND CONDITIONS, SSA, 2008 AND 2030



Source: World Bank, 2013

Social factors

The spread of NCD is inherently linked to social factors (UNDP, 2015) and are closely associated with risk factors such as tobacco use, excessive alcohol use, unhealthy diet, and physical inactivity (WHO, 2011b). These behaviours have physiological implications, including raised blood pressure, overweight/obesity, and hyperglycaemia (high blood sugar/glucose). The World Health Organisation (2011) argues that, “in terms of attributable deaths, the leading NCD risk factor globally is raised blood pressure (to which 13% of global deaths are attributed), followed by obesity (13%), tobacco use (9%), raised blood glucose (6%), physical inactivity (6%), and overweight (5%)”.

Tobacco use

There is overwhelming evidence that tobacco use is a major cause of poor health and mortality from both communicable diseases such as tuberculosis and lower respiratory infections, and NCDs including cardiovascular diseases, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and several types of cancer (Network of African Science Academies, 2013). In global view, tobacco use in Africa is low. Only 2% of cigarettes smoked are in Africa, while only 6% of smokers globally live in Africa (Blecher & Ross, 2013), meaning that there are fewer cigarettes per smoker compared to other parts of the world, most likely due to lower incomes. However, in 2011, WHO estimated that adult tobacco smoking prevalence (men and women) in sub-Saharan Africa ranged from 5% in Niger to 34% in Sierra Leone.

¹²Disability-Adjusted Life Years


TABLE 13: PREVALENT ESTIMATES FOR TOBACCO SMOKING AMONG 15+ MALES AND FEMALES IN AFRICA (2011) AND CURRENT USE OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS AMONG 13-15 YEAR OLDS (2005-2010)

Countries in SSA	Age-standardised prevalence estimates for tobacco smoking among males and females in Africa, (2011)		Current Use of Tobacco Products among African Youth, 13-15 Years, (2005-2010)	
	Aged 15 years and over		Aged 13 - 15	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
East Africa	25	3	18	13
Central Africa	14	3.8	28.8	24.8
Southern Africa	27.5	6.1	26.3	20.3
West Africa	20.8	4.4	20.2	12.7
Total	87.3	17.3	93.3	70.8
Average	21.8	4.3	23.3	17.7

Source: Network of African Science Academies, 2013 and World Bank, 2013

Table 13 shows that prevalence of tobacco use among men aged 15 years old and above in SSA is five times that of women the same age. However, among 13 to 15 year olds, tobacco use among young men is only 1.3 times more than that of young women the same age. Southern Africa has the highest prevalence of tobacco use among both men and women aged 15 years old and above, while Central Africa has the highest tobacco use among young people aged between 13 and 15. With the exception of The Gambia and Central African Republic where young women (aged between 13 and 15) use tobacco more than their male counterparts, all other countries in SSA have a gap between rates of usage in men and in women.

FIGURE 5: FORECAST NUMBER OF ADULT SMOKERS IN AFRICA



Blecher, E. and Ross, H., 2013.

Forecasts show that smoking prevalence in Africa is expected to see a significant increase by 2030. Without comprehensive tobacco prevention and control policies, it is estimated that smoking prevalence will double by 2030 (see Figure 5) making it the largest expected regional increase globally.

The morbidity and mortality caused by such an increase in tobacco prevalence and use, combined with sustained economic growth and changing population dynamics will have devastating effects on health, development efforts, and economic growth in African countries (Blecher & Ross, 2013). Total tobacco-attributable deaths are projected to rise from 6.4 million in 2015 to 8.3 million in 2030, under a baseline scenario.

CORPORATE INFLUENCE ON YOUNG AFRICAN WOMEN'S CIGARETTE USE

The tobacco industry grows their market share by appealing to groups with traditionally low smoking rates, like young African women. They therefore design their products and advertising to make cigarettes seem trendy and socially acceptable through psychological and social appeal to promote values such as 'private time' and 'women's camaraderie' (Network of African Science Academies, 2013).

More recently, in low- and middle-income countries in particular, the tobacco industry has associated its brands with Western ideals and upward mobility, thus appealing to a new generation of women with greater purchasing power and more exposure to globalisation (Network of African Science Academies, 2013). The messaging is also designed to mainstream smoking as an element of women's empowerment and evolving social norms.

By attracting tobacco users at a young age (of age 14), the companies are assured of lifetime buyers. In several countries in Africa, tobacco advertisements specifically target youth by associating cigarettes with trends such as film, sex appeal, well-being, and sports (Network of African Science Academies, 2013).

Unhealthy diet: NCDs have a close relationship to economic marginalization, given that poor people, particularly in urban environments, tend to consume low-priced but also low quality foods which tend to be high in calories and additives but low in nutritional value (UNDP, 2015).

The risk factors for NCDs in Africa are beginning to shift. In Central, East, and West Africa chronic childhood undernourishment, household air pollution from solid fuels, and suboptimal breastfeeding have been the leading causes of disease—but their contribution to the disease burden has fallen substantially (see Figure 4; World Bank, 2013). Africa is now experiencing a nutrition transition. The consumption of refined foods, high in fat and sugar and low in micronutrients, as well as a marked increase in animal food products, contrasted with a fall in total cereal intake and fibre have aggravated the health status of individuals, including contributing to a significant rise of heart disease and type 2 diabetes (UNDP, 2012).

An over-supply of energy dense foods coupled with decreasing physical activity due to the sedentary nature of work, modernised modes of transportation, and increased urbanisation have resulted in obesity (WHO, 2011a). This is a global problem, as today almost 30% of people in the world are overweight or obese, with 62% of them in developing countries (UNDP, 2015). About one quarter of SSA's population is overweight.

Obesity is not just a phenomenon of urban areas (UNDP, 2015). In North African countries such as Egypt and Morocco, rural obesity is catching up. **In Africa, women already have roughly double the obesity prevalence of men** (see Figure 6). Studies show that South Africa, Ghana, Gabon, Cape Verde, and Senegal have between 30-55% adult obesity, with higher rates among adult women due to high calorie and high fat diets (see Table 14 and Figure 6; World Bank, 2013). It is projected that **between 2007 and 2025, there will be an 80% increase in obesity prevalence from 10.4 million to 18.7 million in Africa** (Hakim, Livingston, & Manuel, 2012). **By 2030, the number of overweight children is projected to double** (UNDP, 2015).



FACTS ABOUT OBESITY


- Rates of obesity are growing rapidly in developing nations even in countries where hunger exists
- Obesity is most rampant in urban areas but in some places, it is catching up in rural areas
- Women are more likely to be obese than men in all WHO regions Obesity seems to rise with increased incomes especially among urban women

TABLE 14: SHARE OF RECENT MOTHERS IN SSA WHO ARE UNDERWEIGHT AND OVERWEIGHT

Proportion of recent mothers in SSA		
Countries in SSA	Overweight	Underweight
East Africa	15	14
Central Africa	20.4	12.4
Southern Africa	41.2	6.3
West Africa	22.4	12.5
Total	99	45.2
Average	24.8	11.3

Source: World Bank, 2013

FIGURE 6: AGE-STANDARDISED PREVALENCE OF OVERWEIGHT, RAISED TOTAL CHOLESTEROL AND OBESITY IN ADULTS



Source: WHO, 2011a

With unequally distributed incomes in most developing countries, hunger and obesity now often co-exist in the same country or region, creating a growing ‘double burden of malnutrition’. Improvements in the nutritional status of women and girls are thus a contribution to reducing gender inequality, while also helping break the cycle of impact on intergenerational malnutrition.

Physical inactivity

Overall, physical activity levels are relatively high in Africa, with most activities being either work-related or transport-related. In most African cities, most residents walk or use public transportation for daily routine activities. This is especially so in rural areas. Levels of physical inactivity have been shown to rise with rising urbanisation in Africa and according to the level of country income. High-income countries had more than double the prevalence of physically inactive people compared to low-income countries. It is estimated that 41% of men and 48% of women were insufficiently physically active in high-income countries, compared to 18% of men and 21% of women in low-income countries (WHO, 2011b). In all WHO regions, men were more active than women.

The faster economies grow, the faster the population becomes inactive. In some cases, physical inactivity is projected to increase direct costs of emerging economies by 450% by 2030 (Nike, 2012).

Physically inactive people have a 20-30% increased risk of all-cause mortality compared to those who engage in at least 30 minutes of moderate intensity physical activity on most days of the week. Women are at the heart of that risk given that they tend to be more inactive than men. The increased urbanisation, automation of work and other aspects of life due to higher incomes is a likely determinant of insufficient physical activity among women, even though it will help reduce the 'double shift' women have to do.



FEMINIST QUESTIONS

- African women remain majority producers of food on the continent, yet are increasingly malnourished. What policies are needed for better regulating food quality and enabling access to healthier, more nutritious food?
- As many women face economic barriers to accessing healthier foods, what interventions can be made around pricing of fresh food and supporting local food production, small holder farming, and maintenance of organic farming and nutritious local crops?
- As cancer response expands across the African continent, how do we ensure adequate investment in ethical research, prevention, and response services to address the cancers affecting African women?

2.3.4 Mental health

Mental and behavioural mood disorders (including major depression, bipolar disorder and dysthymia), anxiety, alcohol and drug abuse, and schizophrenia are among the top twenty conditions that result in the greatest burden of disability worldwide. In fact, disability associated with mental and behavioural disorders exceeds the burden associated with NCD's as well as neurological diseases, war, and injuries. Left unabated, unipolar depressive disorder is on track to be the leading cause of total global disease burden by 2030 regardless of income-level (Pike, Susser, & Pincus, 2013).

African women's rights activists have already flagged the need to address mental health, engaging these clinically defined conditions but also the broader and more holistic concept of emotional well-being (Horn, 2014). The trends predicted around mental health are of particular concern to African women and girls living in contexts of high stress, including in extreme economic marginalisation and in contexts of conflict, insecurity, and religious fundamentalism. It is also relevant for women's rights activists and others constantly exposed to mental and emotional stressors (Kistner, 2015).



FEMINIST QUESTIONS

- As we build mental health services responses across the African continent, how do we ensure that they are based on relevant understandings and approaches to mental health in the African region, with attention to gendered mental and emotional health needs?
- How do we expand holistic mental health support to ensure that services and interventions are designed using approaches that empower women as mental health service users, and are financially accessible?

2.4 Education

Education is an important driver of countries' economic performance and potential. As argued by the World Bank, "GDP per capita in low-income countries will be almost 70% higher by 2050 than it would be if current educational trends continued. Extreme poverty rates would reduce by a third because of education alone". Basic literacy is essential, but it is increasingly the quality and accessibility of primary, secondary, and higher education that will determine whether African economies can successfully move up the value-added production chain (AFDB, 2011). In SSA, and as shown in Table 16, only 20% of young children in Africa were enrolled in pre-primary programs in 2012, which is double the 1999 rates. Lack of Early Childhood Education programmes (ECD) prevents children under the age of five from reaching their developmental potential and having good education outcomes in their primary school. This is the only level where girls are slightly more (by 1%) enrolled in school than boys.

There has been an impressive increase in the number of students enrolled in primary school between 1999 and 2012 due to Free Primary Education (FPE) policies in many countries, among other things. However, maintaining a high quality primary education continues to remain a challenge for most countries. There were more boys than girls enrolled in primary school with a gap of 6% in net enrolment in 2012. Unfortunately, the dropout rates of students is high—so that by completion of primary school in 2012, there was a drop out of 24% of boys and 18% of the girls.

A secondary education is essential in preparing students for higher education and important life skills. Additionally, a secondary education provides the skills and tools to help meet a country's growing demands for highly skilled and educated workers in a globalised world. Unfortunately, many students find it generally difficult to attend secondary schools as these schools can only accommodate 36% of qualifying secondary students across Africa. This may explain the outright loss of 13% of boy and 20% of girl students between primary school completion and general gross enrolment in secondary school in 2012. While an equal number of boys and girls survived to the last grade in primary, there was a 7% gap between boys and girls joining secondary school. By the time both boys and girls completed secondary school, there is a 10% attrition rate in both cases.

Evidently, enrolment rates for girls in sub-Saharan Africa fall off significantly in lower secondary school. These barriers at all levels of education limit women's ability to fully realise their potential as transformative leaders (Ernst & Young [EY-Africa], 2011).

Technical and vocational education and training has not been a top priority for many African countries. In 2012, these programs accounted for only 6% of total secondary enrolment in the region (Africa America Institute, 2015). On average, only about 2-6% of educational budgets are devoted to technical and vocation skills development (Africa America Institute, 2015). As a result, only 6% of young people in sub-Saharan Africa are enrolled in higher education institutions, yet a one-year increase in average tertiary education levels would raise annual GDP growth in Africa by 0.39% (Africa America Institute, 2015). Economists argue that higher education pays off as returns on investments are 21% in Africa, the highest in the world. However, education has multiple benefits, including enriching the lives of those who study, expanding the skills and knowledge base of a population, cultivating a vision of common goals and the collective good, expanding understanding of the world, and contributing to more democratic societies.

There are about 50% of out-of-school children in SSA who have never stepped foot in a school in their lifetime (see Table 16; Africa America Institute, 2015). About 47% of young women in Africa never attend school or leave before completing their education, compared to 36% for young men (Mastercard Foundation, 2014). The numbers in SSA are worse, as shown in Table 16 (54% for girls and 46% for boys in 2012).

SSA is set to have a secondary school completion rate of 64% by 2030, with the proportion of children who complete secondary school expected to increase by almost 50% by then. Though it will be the region with the lowest Secondary School Completion Rate (SSCR), it will be the region with the most rapid progress. There is a trend in all the regions in Africa towards the equalisation of female and male access to secondary education, and this is expected to continue in the future. More attention needs to be devoted to not just increasing primary schools enrolment, but ensuring that students stay in school and receive a quality education (ODI, 2015).

Quality is an important concern in education, given that increased access to primary and secondary school education has not resulted in a parallel increase in learning outcomes. The 2016 Education Commission Report highlights the numbers of children in school in sub-Saharan Africa who leave with extremely limited educational outcomes. This report states that only 19% of children in low income countries complete primary school and reach basic international learning benchmarks, while 88% of children in high income countries reach that benchmark.

Looking forward, **analysts predict that the world is set to lose up to two billion jobs through the automation of work forces**¹⁴, underlining the importance of education systems that provide the skills and knowledge for future employment activities, and education that provides young people with the knowledge, skills, initiative, and creativity to survive and thrive in a world where traditional work opportunities will be far more limited, but where other types of labour will be imagined and enacted. This suggests a need for education going into the future that cuts through convention and emphasises agency, creativity, and the capacity to adapt—that has the potential to enable a whole generation with greater learning and greater utilisation of learning for the benefit of all.

Where conventional jobs do remain, companies operating in Africa currently cite insufficiently skilled labour as a bottleneck to growth. By improving the knowledge and skills of workers, especially women, through technical and vocational education and training, local economies can build a skilled workforce to increase the production of goods and services, and contribute to

¹⁴'A Learning Generation' – Report of the International Commission on Financing Global Educational Opportunity 2016

TABLE 16: EDUCATION STATISTICS (MALE/FEMALE) IN SSA (%)

	1994-2004		2005 - 2012	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Adult literacy rates (15 & above) %	68	48	68	50
Youth literacy rates (15 – 24) %	75	62	75	63
	1999		2012	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
GER in pre-primary %	11	10	19	20
Life expectancy (expected number of years of formal schooling from primary to tertiary) in years	7.4	6.1	10	8.8
GER in primary %	86	73	106	98
NER in primary %	63	55	82	76
Repeaters all grades %	11.2	10.3	8.9	8.7
Survival rate to last grade %	59	57	58	58
Total secondary school GER	28	23	45	38
GER in lower secondary school			53	46
GER in upper secondary school			35	28
Out of school adolescents (% of out of school)	43	57	46	54

Source: UNESCO, 2015

Implications of good education for girls

The benefits of education for girls are often couched in language that points out the benefits to others—what needs to be done to emphasise the basic right of all girls to a good quality education whether or not that benefits other segments of society? Good quality education has the capacity to increase self-confidence and promote critical thinking, which are important qualities for girls as they carve out their futures. Yet, many education systems in Africa are based on outdated notions from education policies introduced during colonial regimes in the mid twentieth century.

Although huge investments have been made by countries to expand basic education, and many African countries have now effectively eliminated the gender gap in primary education, gender gaps still exist in secondary and tertiary levels. Investing in the education of girls reaps dual dividends. It improves the quality of life of the women in question, enabling them to be more productive members of society. It also enables them to become champions of human development for their families and communities. The resulting improvement to their children’s welfare and life opportunities has multiplier effects that expand with each new generation.

Studies found that each year of additional schooling for girls reduces infant mortality by 5-10%. The children of mothers with five years of primary education are 40% more likely to live beyond the age of five and 43% less likely to be malnourished.

Women with primary education have fewer children on average, use more productive farming methods and, as non-agricultural workers, receive higher wages (AfDB, 2015). A study carried out by the NIKE Foundation in Kenya estimated that investing in girls would potentially add USD 3.2 billion to the economy (EY-Africa, 2011).

In thinking about girls' education, it is important to consider the broader enabling environment. It has been argued that, "a child's gender, family, ethnic, cultural, and economic background, their geography, their start in life, their health or disability, their exposure to poverty or disorder, conflict, or disaster all play a major role in whether a child will learn and succeed" (Sowa, 2016).



FEMINIST QUESTIONS

- ● The nature and content of education in the past has often underscored societal prejudices and discrimination. How do governments, activist groups, and communities ensure educational systems that promote social justice, social cohesion, and equality?
- ● How can equality, non-discrimination, holistic learning, and independence of thinking be better woven into educational reform as African nations strengthen educational outcomes for students from primary to tertiary education?
- ● The rights and needs of those who are most disadvantaged and most discriminated against, and of children who are marginalised in multiple ways must be prioritised if the individual and collective benefits of strong educations are to be realised by 2030. How do we change mindsets to promote truly inclusive education?

2.5 Religion

Rates of religiosity across the African continent are high, with studies showing 90% of Africans saying that religion is very important in their lives (Flynn, 2010). Religion across the continent is diverse, with people practicing world religions such as Christianity and Islam, small pockets of Hinduism and Buddhism, and various forms of African traditional religion often practiced alongside Christianity or Islam.

In global view, the PEW Research Centre estimates that **by 2050, 4 out of every 10 Christians in the world will live in sub-Saharan Africa**. Projections show that Nigeria will have the third largest Christian population, following the USA and Brazil (Pew Research Center, 2015). If current global trends continue, by 2050 the number of Muslims (29.7%) will nearly equal the number of Christians (31.4%) across the world (Pew Research Center, 2015). Atheists, agnostics, and other people who do not affiliate with any religion—though increasing in many countries around the world—will make up a small share of the world's total population (Pew Research Center, 2015).

The impact of organised religion on people's take on gender norms

Religion plays a significant role in shaping gender norms across Africa at the individual, community, and also state levels. A majority of Africans align themselves with a named faith. Religious institutions also play significant roles in community practices and in the delivery of essential services across much of the African continent. In the policy arena, recent years have shown the close interplay between religion and formal governance around women's rights (Horn, 2013).

At an individual level, religious discourse affects understandings of gender and what it means to be a woman, a man, or to be gender non-conforming. Some have argued that where women find themselves marginalised and unable to assert their value in the public economic sphere due to discrimination, traditional religion upholds women's value in the private sphere through a reification of women's role as mothers (Women for Women International, 2003). Religion also serves as a uniting force for populations in their resistance of unjust, corrupt, or ineffective governments, and provides an identity for minority groups like women that otherwise don't fit in (Women for Women International, 2003). Women are active in charismatic Christian movements across Africa, a phenomenon analysts attribute to the fact that they provide women with consistent community structures in the midst of state and personal instability.

The Pentecostal gospel of prosperity, which promises wealth to the faithful, legitimizes—in principle—women's struggle for economic independence (Spink, 2003).

As many scholars and theologians have analysed, religions rooted in patriarchal norms do not necessarily forward egalitarian views on women (Oduyoye, 1995; Uchem, 2003). This translates into the policy arena, where Christians and Muslim institutions alike have expressed very strong opposition towards issues such as abortion, sex work, suicide, and homosexuality, with nine in 10 or more in many countries calling these practices morally wrong (Flynn, 2010). By justifying social hierarchies and endorsing the existing power structures, religions have served a useful function in justifying men's dominant power (Barber, 2012).

The widespread growth of religious fundamentalisms to control women's bodily autonomy and policing of strict gender norms is a hallmark of fundamentalist ideology that transcends all religious and geographical boundaries (Balchin & Shankaran, 2012; Imam, Marler, & Malik, 2016).

This stands as a huge barrier to achieving gender equality and women empowerment, and is thus an important angle for debate and action in advancing women's rights in the African region.



03.

ECONOMIC TRENDS



3.1 Economic performance

Economic growth in SSA in 2014 averaged 5%. This growth was mainly driven by the extractive sector and growth infrastructural development, as well as rising consumption in low-income countries. The rise in oil prices and the Ebola pandemic in West Africa slowed down the economic growth prospects in 2015 to 4.5 % (see Table 17). The economic performance would still make SSA among the fastest-growing regions of the world (IMF, 2015).


TABLE 17: SSA GDP GROWTH¹⁵(2010 – 2016)

Economic growth	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
World economic growth	5.4	4.1	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.5	3.7
SSA GDP growth	6.7	5	4.2	5.2	5	4.5	5.1
SSA inflation rate	7.7	10.2	8.2	6.1	6.1	7.4	6.6
Oil exporting SSA countries	8.5	4.7	3.7	5.7	5.8	4.5	5.2
Resource intensive countries	6.7	4.8	4.2	4.7	4.5	3.9	4.4
SSA frontier and emerging market economies	7.1	5.1	4.3	4.9	5	4.6	4.9
Low income countries	7.6	7.6	6.1	7.1	7.4	6.5	7.1
Fragile states	4.1	3.1	7.4	5.6	5.6	6.1	6.5

Source: IMF, 2015

Other sectors driving the economies in Africa are agriculture, manufacturing, construction and, in particular, services. As shown in Figure 7, agriculture—though declining as a GDP earner—is still a high employer; 80% of the African population depends on the sector for their livelihood which also provides employment for about 60% of the economically active population and for about 70% of the poorest people on the continent, most of who are women (AfDB, 2010).

FIGURE 7: GDP EARNERS IN AFRICA BY SECTOR



Source: UNDP, 2015

¹⁵Resource intensive countries include Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe; Emerging market economies include Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.

Extrapolations of current economic performance suggest a positive future to 2030 as shown in Table 18. The projected breakdown of GDP by sub-region indicates that **North Africa will continue to post the highest income per capita while East Africa is likely to show the strongest growth performance, reaching 9.3% in 2030 (AfDB, 2011)**. However, Africa's growth is by no means assured. A dramatic decline in Africa's poverty would require the continent to grow at an average of 7%. The above projections fall short of that level. There are also serious risks ahead to Africa's growth path (AfDB, 2011).

- Global developments, particularly the escalating price of commodities like food and oil, pose serious threats to governance, peace, and security—factors that affect economic growth.
- Africa's growth prospects will be heavily influenced by trends in labour availability. Economic performance relies primarily on human resources, which strongly impact overall productivity. Continued rapid growth in the size of the economically active population (men and women 15- 64 years of age) without meaningful employment will pose great challenges.
- The movement of working age people from rural areas to urban centres can be instrumental in accelerating economic growth. While this population migration leads to more diversified economies, away from reliance on subsistence agriculture and toward sectors such as manufacturing and service activities, it can create high urban unemployment, increase crime, and thus lower economic growth.

TABLE 18: AFRICA'S PROJECTED GDP GROWTH BY REGION

Economic growth	2020	2030
Africa	6.2	5.9
Central Africa	7.2	6.8
East Africa	7.9	9.3
North Africa	5.5	4.8
Southern Africa	3.9	5.3
West Africa	8.8	5.5

Source: AfDB, 2011

Does high GDP lead to equality for women?

Women contribute substantially to economic welfare through large amounts of unpaid work, such as child-rearing, household and community tasks, which are often 'invisibilised' and remain unseen and unaccounted for in the GDP (IMF, 2015). Excluding household production through unpaid care work from national accounts leads to misestimating households' material well-being and societies' wealth. **If included, unpaid care work would constitute 35-55 % of GDP in Africa** (Latigo & Neijwa, 2005).

While Africa's economy is projected to grow in the coming years, economic growth does not reduce poverty by itself. While conventional economics says that growth leads to poverty reduction, it is important to note that the gain from increased national productivity does not automatically trickle down to the poorest people, most of whom are women (DFID, 2008). In Zambia, for example, GDP per capita growth averaged 3% every year between 2004 and 2013, pushing Zambia into the World Bank's lower-middle income category.

Resource intensive countries include Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe; Emerging market economies include Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.

Despite this growth, the number of people living below the USD 1.25 poverty line grew from 65% in 2003 to 74% in 2010. With the feminisation of poverty, one can only conclude that the level of deprivation has intensified disproportionately for women and children in Zambia, and along with it other types of discrimination and social injustices (Oxfam, 2015).

More recent studies prove that the rate of poverty reduction varies with income distribution. One unit of growth in more equal societies reduces poverty faster than the same unit of growth in more unequal societies, because it takes greater growth to lift a person out of poverty in more unequal environments, which undermines future growth efforts (Go, Nikitin, Wang, & Zou, 2007). A case in point is in Kenya, where according to projections done by Oxfam (2015), “if inequality remains at the same level for the next five years, three million more people could be living in extreme poverty than if the Gini coefficient was reduced.” A 0.43 Gini would reduce poverty among 700,000; 0.42 Gini would reduce poverty among 1.3 million people; 0.37 Gini would reduce poverty among 4.2 million people; and a 0.32 Gini would reduce poverty among 6.8 million people in 2011.

The service sector is projected to continue growing as the main GDP earner in Africa. Unfortunately, this sector absorbs fewer highly educated people, due to the sophistication of the sector and mechanisation of processes (see Figure 7). When agriculture stimulates growth in Africa, the growth is twice as effective in reducing poverty (EY-Africa, 2014). The further decline of agriculture as a significant GDP earner in the future means that women, who provide 70% of the labour in this sector (Latigo & Neijwa, 2005), will be relegated to more vulnerability.

3.2 Economic security and justice

3.2.1 Female labour force participation rate (FLFPR)


As pointed out in section 2.1.2, due to declining fertility rates, SSA is in the early stages of a demographic transition due to declining fertility rates. Due to additional labour supply, such a transition could prompt a ‘demographic dividend’. For this dividend to be achieved, sufficient productive opportunities must be accessible for those entering the labour market (ILO, 2015). Job creation and an enabling environment for women’s ability to work is critical.

Average labour force participation (LFP)¹⁶ in the world was 63.5% in 2014. Female labour force participation rate (FLFPR) hovered around 50% over the past two decades, with levels and trends varying across global regions (IMF, 2015). In sub Saharan Africa, FLFPR is 65.4% (UNDP, 2015) while that of men is 76.6%—giving SSA the highest LFPR of all regions, estimated at 70.9% (ILO, 2015). Evidently, women participate less in the labour force than their male counterparts.

¹⁶LFP is the proportion of a country’s working-age population (ages 15 and older) that engages in the labour market, either by working or actively looking for work, expressed as a percentage of the working-age population.

However, this employment is plagued with vulnerability. Across most parts of the world, women are more likely to be in vulnerable employment¹⁷ such as being self-employed or a contributing family worker, without any formal pay. As shown in Figure 8, SSA has the second highest share of vulnerable employment (at 80% of women; UN Women, 2011) after South Asia. Level of pay contributes highest to the vulnerability of workers in SSA. As reiterated by the ILO, “women are overrepresented in sectors that are characterized by low status and pay” (IMF, 2013). Low pay is followed by very low access to various worker benefits (see Table 19).

**FIGURE 8: % SHARE OF LABOUR FORCE IN VULNERABLE EMPLOYMENT
ACROSS REGIONS OF THE WORLD**



Source: UNDP, 2015

TABLE 19: WORK WITH EXPLOITATION, RISKS, AND INSECURITIES IN SSA

Work with exploitation, risks and insecurities in SSA	
Category of labour	% share of labour force
Child labour	24.7
Working poor at USD 2 a day	70.5
Unemployment benefits recipient	2.3
Mandatory paid maternity leave	90
Old age pensions recipients	21.9

Source: UNDP, 2015

¹⁷Vulnerable employment refers to percentage of employed people engaged as unpaid family workers, or engaged in work lacking decent working conditions, adequate voice, and social security.

Informality

The informal sector contributes about 55% of SSA's GDP and employs 80% of the labour force (The Africa Center, 2014). Nine out of 10 rural and urban workers have informal jobs in Africa and most of these people are women and youth (The Africa Center, 2014). 80% of total employment for women and more than 60% for men is non-wage (The Africa Center, 2014). The largest employer in Africa (agriculture) is also the most insecure, as almost 90% of jobs provided in the sector are vulnerable (The Africa Center, 2014).

Unemployment

According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), about 5.9% of the labour force was without a job, with wide variations across countries. In particular, countries in North Africa and SSA and the Middle East continued to suffer from high unemployment rates, in some cases up to 30% of the labour force (ILO, 2015). Youth and especially young women continue to be disproportionately affected by unemployment. The youth unemployment rate is practically three times higher than is the case for their adult counterparts. The heightened youth unemployment situation is common to all regions and is occurring despite improved educational attainment, thereby fuelling social discontent.

As shown in Table 20, vulnerable employment is projected to slightly decline, perhaps due to heightened awareness of rights and implementation of relevant legislation. There will also be an increase in the real wage growth. Unemployment levels are expected to remain stable through to 2019, although the absolute numbers will be much more in this period given the projected population growth. LFPR is projected to slightly increase from 70.8 in 2014 to 71.3 in 2019. Youth unemployment rate is projected to remain steady. This trend is worrying particularly because the absolute numbers of unemployed youth will be much more, given the youth bulge; but also, employment growth including that of youth is projected to decline. Female unemployment rate is currently at 8.7%, while male unemployment rate is 6.9% in Africa.

TABLE 17: SSA GDP GROWTH (2010 – 2016)

	2007		2014		2019	
	North Africa	SSA	North Africa	SSA	North Africa	SSA
Vulnerable employment	45	75	40	75	39	70
Unemployment	11.4	7.8	12.4	7.7	12.5	7.6
	2009		2013		2019	
Labour force participation rate		70.4		70.8		71.3
Youth unemployment rate		12.5		11.8		11.8
Employment growth		2.8		3.3		3
Youth employment growth		2.2		3.3		2.6
Real wage growth		3.2		0.4		1.4

Source: ILO, 2015

Women's labour rights

Governments have taken steps to regulate formal employment, but these regulations do not apply to the informal sector where 80% of women work. Women also perform a double shift when they juggle both formal employment and household chores. They bear the brunt of the infrastructure challenges across Africa and as such, they spend 40 billion hours per year fetching water and firewood (EY-Africa, 2011). With increased education, urbanisation, incomes, and improved technologies, women's care work will need to become increasingly valued, formal, documented, and socially protected by 2030 to guarantee basic rights to a minimum wage, pension, and social security. Additionally, the global connectivity provided by social networks will help challenge unfair labour practices like the wage gap between men and women which oscillates between 10 to 30% lower than their male counterparts (EY-Africa, 2011).

3.2.2 Trade and access to markets

Women make a major contribution to trade in most African countries through their involvement in the production of tradable goods as market women, as cross-border traders, and as managers and owners of firms involved in trade. Although often overlooked as economic actors, market women play a pivotal role in many African economies. A study of women market traders in four West African countries, for example, found that even if market women surveyed had low levels of formal education themselves, they would use their income to educate between 3-10 children including up to tertiary/professional level (AWDF, 2016).

FACTS ABOUT CROSS BORDER TRADE IN SSA

- In a survey of more than 600 traders conducted by the World Bank, 90% of the respondents were women, confirming the importance of women in this sector. Most of the traders were not part of formal trade networks or trader associations.
- The majority cross-border traders traded food i.e. cereals, pulses, fruits, and vegetables in small quantities and transported their wares mainly by head-carrying (World Bank, 2010).
- Start-up capital was less than USD 50 and was obtained from informal sources of credit, particularly through family networks (World Bank, 2010).
- Estimates suggest that informal cross-border trade is a source of income for about 43% of the total African population (Afrika & Ajumbo, 2012).
- Women traders often face poor conditions and harassment when crossing the border. In the Great Lakes region, more than 80% of traders reported having to pay a bribe to cross the border.
- More than 50% had suffered from physical harassment and abuse, including beatings, verbal insults, stripping, sexual harassment, and even rape (World Bank, 2010). Much of this abuse is unreported.


Trade and women's access to markets

Regional trade in Africa can play a vital role in diversifying economies and reducing dependence on the export of a few products, in delivering food security, in generating jobs, and in alleviating poverty and promoting a shared prosperity (World Bank, 2010). The likely growth of intraregional trade points to greater regional integration, suggesting the possibility of a world order built more around regional structures (National Intelligence Council, 2012), with implications around women's migrant work and cross-border trading.

3.2.3 Financial inclusion

Economic growth (see Section 3.1) has to be inclusive to be socially and politically sustainable. One key component of inclusive development is financial inclusion.¹⁸ Africa's financial system is underdeveloped. Factors that have limited financial access include: low and volatile income levels hence lack of enough resources to use a bank account, inflationary environments, high illiteracy rates, inadequate infrastructure, governance challenges, the high cost of banking¹⁹, lack of the required documentation and distance to the bank (AfDB, 2013).

FIGURE 9: FINANCIAL ACCESS IN AFRICA



Source: AfDB, 2013

¹⁸Financial inclusion refers to all initiatives that make formal financial services available, accessible, and affordable to all segments of the population.

¹⁹According to AfDB, 2013—in Uganda, maintaining a checking account costs the equivalent of 25 per cent of GDP per capita annually.

As shown in Figure 10—overall, 23% of adults in Africa have an account at a formal financial institution; although within Africa, there is a large variation in account ownership ranging from 42% in Southern Africa to 7% in Central Africa. Throughout Africa, there is a 7% gender gap with more men than women owning a bank account at a financial institution (National Intelligence Council, 2012). Urban dwellers, middle aged people, those with tertiary education and above, as well as the wealthy have more bank accounts than their rural, middle aged, lowly educated counterparts. The implication is that the most vulnerable sections of populations are those more likely to be financially excluded. Technological advances such as mobile money achieved the broadest success in financial access in Africa. In one study, 88% of women indicated that mobile phones enabled them to increase their economic participation (Jiyane & Mostert, 2010).

Removing physical, bureaucratic, and financial barriers to expand financial inclusion requires addressing the underlying structural causes such as low-income levels and governance challenges. Successful use of mobile money proves that innovations can bring about dramatic changes in how people engage in financial transactions by lowering entry barriers, reducing costs, and expanding access. Broadening access to financial services will mobilise greater household savings for women, which enable them to marshal capital for investment and enable more women to invest in themselves and their families.

FINANCIAL INCLUSION OF WOMEN IN KENYA

Prior to 2013, only 23% of females had bank accounts compared to 36% of males. More women (26.6%) were excluded from access to financial services than men (24.2%). Some of these women experienced multiple exclusion especially if they were young, with less education, and if they dwelled in rural areas. Mobile technology significantly improved access to the financial services of women. By 2013, 58% of women used mobile phone financial service provider (MFSP) compared to only 23% of women who used banks.

While in 2006, the highest money transfers method was through family/friends (57%); by 2013, 92% of money transfers in the country were done through mobile phones. M-Shwari (a mobile money facility built to extend financial inclusion by integrating savings and borrowing) hit 1 million customers faster than Facebook did. It is estimated that 25% to 43% of Kenya's Gross National Product (GNP) flows through mobile technology. Kenyans sent an average of Ksh 118 billion (\$1.4 billion) per month through M-pesa.

Source: Central Bank of Kenya, 2013

3.2.4 Control over land

Gender inequalities in land rights are persistent. Not only do women have lower access to land than men, they are often also restricted to the so-called secondary land rights, meaning that they hold these rights through male family members. Women thus risk losing entitlements in case of divorce, widowhood, or their husband's migration. Evidence also shows that women's parcels are generally of smaller size and lower quality (Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO], 2010).

Control over land is the basis for the economic rights and livelihoods of millions of rural women. Although they contribute 70% of the labour used to produce food and produce about 90% of the food for both household consumption and sale (Latigo & Neijwa, 2005), their access to and control over land in Africa remains minimal.

An international comparison of agricultural census data shows that less than 20% of landholders are women. The situation is particularly grim in West and Central Africa, as well as North Africa, where generally less than 10% of landholders are women. In East and Southern Africa, women seem to have somewhat better access to land. In some countries, up to 30% of individual land titles are held by women (FAO, 2010). The 2004 African Gender and Development Index (AGDI) findings from 12 African countries²⁰ revealed that women's access to land was, on average, less than half of that enjoyed by men.

Women's control over land

There is a direct relationship between women's right to land and future economic empowerment, future food security, and future poverty reduction. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO, 2011) estimates that if women had the same access to productive resources as men, they could increase yields on their farms by 20 to 30%. Closing the gender gap in access to and use of productive resources and services would unlock the productivity potential of rural women and substantially increase agricultural outputs by 2.5-4% (FAO, 2011). Narrowing the gender gap in agricultural productivity is therefore vital to reducing poverty. Of course, higher gains would be felt in countries where women are more involved in agriculture.

Increased recognition of women's rights to inheritance and property are crucial factors in reducing women's vulnerability to physical and psychological violence. Women's secure land rights and land ownership are associated with a woman's increased ability to participate in household decision-making, control over 50% of the crop income, better educational achievement of the children, better nutrition for the family and lower risks of marital violence (Gomez & Tran, 2012) as well as higher probability of child survival (EY-Africa, 2011).

While data currently shows that women are central to the wellbeing of family units and communities, it will also be important to consider whether shifting gender relations and gender roles will also see men taking on a greater responsibility regarding wellbeing in the private sphere, and how this in turn will affect development outcomes.

²⁰Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, and Uganda

3.2.5 Food sovereignty

An increasing population is heightening the demand for food, and this demand is exceeding the modest production growth. The reasons behind Africa's poor agricultural performance are myriad—including a policy environment that consistently undermines agriculture. This is further exacerbated by agro-climatic conditions, including significant droughts (International Food Policy Research Institute, 2001).

As population growth slows, people will diversify their diets away from cereals because of rising prosperity and changing dietary preferences. Growth in cereal demand in SSA is projected to decline from 2.3% annually to 1.3% by 2020. Yields for all cereals have been slowing since the early 1980s in nearly all regions. **Although farmers in SSA are projected to bring another 20 million hectares of cereal production under the plough by 2020, SSA will still be unable to fully meet its cereal demand from its own production.** International trade will therefore play a larger role in providing the deficit. Net cereal imports will more than double by 2020 and countries that falter economically—leaving them unable to muster enough foreign exchange to pay for adequate food imports—will become increasingly vulnerable to food shortages.

Although sharp falls in food prices over the last two decades were a great benefit to the poor (who spend a large share of their income on food), shocks to agriculture—particularly failure to meet farmers' needs for water and other farm inputs—could push food prices up significantly. SSA is therefore likely to remain a 'hot-spot' of hunger and malnutrition, an issue that affects women and children disproportionately. In sub-Saharan Africa, the number of people suffering from hunger is set to fall by 8% from 195 million to 180 million between 2015 and 2030 (ODI, 2015). As population pressure increases, more land will be cultivated for longer periods of time, reducing vegetative cover, lowering soil fertility, and accelerating erosion—with the result that crop yields will be reduced by between 17-30% by 2020. Other projections suggest that crop yields will be halved within 30 to 50 years.

Trends in agriculture at present are pushing towards growing corporate control of food production, including privatisation of seeds. This has implications for African women smallholder farmers—the majority substance food producers in the region (African Biodiversity Network & Gaia Foundation, 2015).



FEMINIST QUESTIONS

- How can women farmers be protected against growing corporate control of agriculture and the subsequent influence on agricultural policies? Africa has the most 'unutilised' land in all continents, fuelling an influx of interest and attempts to buy such arable land for a range of uses. Given land rights and documentation issues on the continent, how can women's rights be ensured in this sector, in the face of powerful national and global interest groups?

3.3 Poverty reduction, inequality and the emergence of a middle class

3.3.1 Poverty reduction

Over the past 20 years, despite the successive global food and financial crises, Africa has maintained a high growth rate. Economic growth (although not the only ingredient) is essential to alleviate poverty, build livelihoods, and improve quality of life. As a result of economic growth, the proportion of people living in extreme poverty (below the threshold of USD 1.24 per day) has fallen from over 50% in 1981 to less than 45% in 2012 (AfDB, 2014). Data from household surveys also show some improvements in living standards.

In the Global South, extreme poverty is projected to fall from 17% in 2011 to between 3-7% of the population by 2030 if current trends continue (ODI, 2015). Most concerning is the fact that one in three people will be living on less than USD1.25 a day and **the number of people living in extreme poverty in Africa is actually expected to rise by 50 million (from 410 million to 460 million) between 2011 and 2030 due to population growth** (ODI, 2015).

3.3.2 Inequality

Income inequality is set to worsen globally if current trends continue, as four out of five people live in countries where the bottom 40% of the income distribution has experienced slower income growth than the average. In sub-Saharan Africa, growth is expected to remain relatively equitable as the bottom 40% is set to grow at the same rate as the average (ODI, 2015).

SSA's progress in reducing poverty will continue to be slow because of high inequalities. Faster reduction in poverty will require growth with equity (World Bank Africa's Pulse, 2013). It has been estimated that a 1% increase in income levels could result in a 4.3% decline in poverty in countries with very low inequality, or as little as a 0.6% decline in poverty in highly unequal countries (DFID, 2008).

3.3.3 Emergence of a middle class

In discussing changing class dynamics in Africa, it is important to note that global development institutions currently define Africa's middle class as those earning between USD 2 to USD 20 per day²¹, which translates to USD 730 to USD 7300 annually. These figures constitute the working class in countries like USA (the American middle class was constituted as those earning between USD 25,000 and USD 75,000 in 2006).

The reference to Africa's middle class is not reflective of the global standards and therefore, could in fact bring into question the narrative around this economic transition, while obscuring the fact that Africa's middle class—as defined—are in fact still economically vulnerable. With that caveat in mind, the statistics are useful to consider.

²¹Definition by African Development Bank

Most African countries are projected to attain upper middle-income status, thus eliminating extreme forms of poverty (AfDB, 2011). Using current definitions, Africa's 'middle class' has grown to some 350 million people (34% of Africa's population), up from 126 million in 1980 (27% of the population). This represents a growth rate of 3.1% in the 'middle class' population from 1980 to 2010, compared with a growth rate of 2.6% in the continent's overall population over the same period. Africa's 'middle class' is projected to continue to grow and reach 1.1 billion (42% of the population) by 2060 (AfDB, 2014).

The more affluent lifestyle associated with the middle class has contributed to increased domestic consumption in many African countries. Sales of refrigerators, television sets, mobile phones, motors, and automobiles have surged in virtually every country in recent years. **Consumer spending in Africa, primarily by the 'middle class', has reached an estimated USD 1.3 trillion in 2010 (60% of Africa's GDP) and is projected to double by 2030.** As such, the middle class is helping to foster private sector growth in Africa as they offer a key source of effective demand for goods and services supplied by private sector entities (AfDB, 2014). However, despite having incomes which are above national poverty lines, the 'middle class' in Africa remains vulnerable. The nature of employment (many work in the informal sector), education (few have university degrees), and consumer behaviour does not coincide with perceptions of a middle class that will sustain domestic consumption and growth in the future. The social protection systems, which should provide a safety net for this group, fail to reach even half of this population, as coverage rates of informal workers are extremely limited (Pezzini, 2012). The vulnerability of Africa's 'middle class' is especially worrying—if those in the middle have precarious incomes and unstable employment, their consumption cannot be counted upon to drive economic growth, nor can their growth be taken as a sign of social progress.

Implications of a growing population of 'middle class' women

In mainstream economics, the emerging 'middle class' is understood as a critical economic and social actor because of its potential as an engine of growth due to vigorous accumulation of capital, be it physical (plant, equipment or housing) or human capital (education or health), but also due to increased consumption. The increase of women in the labour market means that they too are included in this group, unlike before, when women rarely participated in the formal economy. Consolidating this incipient income group into a stable middle class could provide a solid foundation for economic progress and could also contribute to lifting the poor in a society, key among them being women.

Besides consuming, the social role of the middle class, including middle class women, remains equally important. Strong middle classes can effectively influence economic development through more active participation in the political process, expressing support for political programmes and electoral platforms, in particular those that promote inclusive growth.



● FEMINIST QUESTIONS

Feminist economists (see Balakrishnan, Heintz and Elson, 2016) are questioning the common acceptance of traditional economic models, including their undervaluing of the roles of women in economies. Given the feminist concerns around equity, equality, and justice, what new questions need to be asked in economic theory and data collection that would help promote a wider analysis of economic trends and a greater diversity of economic models? How can we use these models to better account for women's economic contributions and concerns?



04.

POLITICAL TRENDS



4.1 Governance

While women already serve as leaders across Africa—in their homes and communities, in civil society, in business, as civil servants and politicians (AfDB, 2015)—the one area that most signifies the challenge of gender inequality on the continent is women’s participation in leadership and decision-making (The Centre for Citizens’ Participation in the African Union [CCP-AU], 2012). Participation is premised on the fact that all men and women should have a voice in decision-making, either directly or through legitimate intermediate institutions that represent their interests. Such broad participation is built on freedom of association and speech, as well as capacities to participate constructively.

4.1.1 Women’s participation in political leadership and decision making in Africa

Whereas in the 1980s it was virtually unheard of for a woman to run for public office, since the 1990s, women have made significant advances (Institute for Defence Analyses [IDA-Africa Watch], 2014). By 2011, 28 countries had reached or surpassed the 30% mark for women’s representation in parliament (UN Women, 2011).

As shown in Figure 11, women in Africa occupy on average 22.5% of legislative seats across the continent (IDA-Africa Watch, 2014). Although this figure is only marginally lower than the averages for the Americas (25.2 %) and Europe (23.5 %), and higher than the averages for Asia and the Middle East, it masks positive examples at the national level. In Rwanda, 63.8% of parliamentarians are women, the highest rate in the world, yet many other African countries have much lower rates (see Appendix B for more country specific numbers).

East and Southern Africa have the highest representation of women in both the lower and the upper houses, while Western Africa has the least representation of women in both houses. Between 2011 and 2015, 16 countries had reached or surpassed the 30% mark for women’s representation in parliament (8 in East Africa²², 2 in Southern Africa²³, 2 in Central Africa²⁴, 3 in Northern Africa²⁵, and 1 in Western Africa²⁶).

Women’s representation at the ministerial level remained more or less the same in East Africa between 2012 and 2015, while it declined for West, Central and West Africa (see Figure 12 and more details in Appendix C). In Kenya, the increase in women’s participation is attributed to the two-thirds gender rule in the Constitution which was promulgated in 2010, and which provides that “not more than two-thirds of the members of appointive and elective bodies shall be of the same gender”.²⁷

²² i.e. Rwanda (63.8%), Seychelles (43.8%), Mozambique (39.6%), Ethiopia (38.8%), Tanzania (36.6%), Burundi (36.4%), Uganda (33.5%), Zimbabwe (31.5%)

²³ i.e. South Africa (41.7%) and Namibia (41.3%)


²⁴ i.e. Angola (36.8%) and Cameroon (31.1%)

²⁵ i.e. Algeria (31.6%), Tunisia (31.3%) and Sudan (30.5%)

²⁶ i.e. Senegal (42.7%)


²⁷ This principle is reiterated in two parts of the Constitution—the Bill of Rights and the general principles of the electoral system (i.e. Article 27(8) and Article 81(b))

FIGURE 10: PROPORTION OF WOMEN IN NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS BETWEEN 2011 AND 2015



Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union [IPU], 2016

FIGURE 11: %WOMEN REPRESENTATION IN MINISTERIAL POSITIONS BETWEEN 2012 AND 2015



Source: Hiraga & Maega, 2014; Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), 2015

The provisions in the various instruments related to women’s equality are all very clear on what needs to be done to increase women’s participation in decision making and leadership. The proposed strategies include—capacity building for women to participate and compete effectively, support for the various women’s structure, and working to change discriminatory attitudes to women’s leadership. Political parties should ensure they create mechanisms for increased participation by women in internal party processes as a launching pad for enhanced women’s participation in national and international contests. Continued and sustained engagement with political parties to implement their gender sensitive policies is critical. Further reform of electoral laws in most African countries is necessary in order to adopt electoral systems that promote the participation of women. The need for gender parity is evident, both in its own right as central to women’s political equality, and also in light of the contribution that this can make to further advancing women’s rights. Evidence shows that an increase in women’s representation in parliaments worldwide has been followed by legal reform to expand women’s rights and access to justice (UN Women, 2011).

Looking to the future: While forecasting of democracy and of other governance variables is much more difficult because changes in governance tend to be rather irregular and dramatic, there are already indications on what to expect. Income and education will be important in determining democracy levels for Africa going forward (Institute for Security Studies, 2011), including women’s participation in governance.

Their increase is likely to expand the middle class whose demand for rule of law, government accountability, and equity is likely to increase (National Intelligence Council, 2012). The rapid advances in information, communications, and other technologies coupled with social networking will continue to be a potentially potent political weapon. The pressure of social networks, particularly on governmental power, will almost certainly grow even stronger. With all that said, **at the current rate of change, representation of women in legislatures will not reach parity with men in developing countries until at least 2047** (Ernst & Young, 2011).

4.2 Access to justice

4.2.1. Legal protections

The law is a powerful tool for promoting and protecting the rights of women and girls. Access to justice is therefore premised on the fact that legal frameworks should be fair and enforced impartially to both women and men. The law itself, however, is highly influenced by gendered social norms (UN Women, 2011), which in turn means that laws that do support equality are not always implemented to advance equality. An example of this is the fact that all but two African countries (Somalia and Sudan; UN Women, 2011) have ratified the Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa.

However, in regions like East Africa, despite having the highest proportion of countries with constitutional provisions that recognise equal rights to work and rights to equal pay for work of equal value, the same region has the least proportion of statutory protection granted to equal pay. This is compared to Central Africa where none of the countries has constitutional provisions, yet all the countries in the region have statutory protection granted to equal pay. This points to the challenge of implementing existing laws to protecting women's rights and/or the sustained political will to achieve substantive equality through gender-sensitive policy making.

There are also cases where laws explicitly limit women's rights within the family, such as a wife requiring a husband's permission to open a bank account (see Table 20 and Appendix D for more detailed data). In Swaziland and Guinea Bissau, this is the case despite the fact that their constitutions explicitly provide for gender equality in property ownership. In this case, effective implementation of constitutional guarantees is challenged by the existence of multiple laws that contradict each other, thus curtailing the rights of women (UN Women, 2011).

TABLE 20: INDICATORS BASED ON CONSTITUTIONS, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS, AND STATUTES IN EFFECT AS OF JUNE 2011

Region	Features of the Constitution	Legal capacity of men and women	Administration of property within marriage	Division of property upon divorce	Land rights	Features of the Constitution	Restrictions on and Protection of Women's Labour Rights
	Explicitly provides for gender equality in property ownership (%Yes)	Wife requires husband's permission to open bank account (% no)	Husband must gain wife's consent in managing marital property (%Yes)	Marital property is divided equally upon divorce (%Yes)	Women's land rights are granted statutory protection under land laws (%Yes)	Recognises equal rights to work, right to equal pay for work of equal value, or both (%Yes)	Statutory protection is granted to equal pay for work of equal value (%Yes)
East Africa	25	100	26.7	33.3	62.5	26.7	66.7
Central Africa	0	75	50	62.5	28.6	0	100
Southern Africa	20	60	40	60	60	20	80
West Africa	18.8	75	25	31.3	31.3	18.8	86.7

NOTE: There was no data for Djibouti, South Sudan and North Africa
Source: World Bank [Driemeier, M.H. and Hasan, T.], 2013

4.2.2 Personal safety

A second area in which women's rights are least protected, where the rule of law is weakest and men's privilege is often most entrenched, is women's rights in the private and domestic sphere, including their rights to live free from violence and to make decisions about their sexuality and on marriage, divorce and reproductive health (UN Women, 2011). Prevalence of violence against women has persisted at epidemic proportions across the African continent and forms a continuum across times of conflict and peace.

Violence against women is an acute problem across Africa and one that is very challenging to address, as women are exposed to violence from intimate partners, neighbours, acquaintances, and strangers. Rape is used extensively as a weapon of war. Yet even in the most violent conflict zones, the evidence suggests that women are more far likely to suffer sexual violence from intimate partners than from strangers. The prevalence of intimate partner violence is at 37% across Africa. Rates vary widely across countries and regions, however, peaking at 60% in Central Africa (AfDB, 2015).

Legal responses to violence against women across the African continent are weak and often adjudicated under customary or religious law or informally within the family, often providing weaker protections for women. As UN Women (2011) argues, 'The existence of multiple strands of law based on custom, ethnic, or religious identity incorporated into the state system are used to adjudicate on matters of marriage, divorce, custody and maintenance, as well as inheritance laws. These plural legal provisions sometimes contain elements of discrimination against women.'

Looking to the future

There is as yet no data that projects the future of gendered access to justice. However patterns from the past can help guide a sense of what the future may look like. Advocacy by African women's rights activists, campaigns, and organisations has been a critical lever for legal reform on gender equality across Africa since independence. This has included strategies such as strategic litigation, lobbying and advocacy in all legal jurisdictions, from sub-national to international (Bennett & Tamale, 2011; Muriithi, 2007). These groups are thus likely to remain a key driver of access to justice and for progress on ending violence against women moving into the future.

THINKING ABOUT VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE FUTURE

Changing demographics, economies, politics, and cultures across Africa raise questions for the future about potential new forms of violence against women and girls, or new contexts in which violence takes place. Urbanisation across Africa has already posed challenges around women and girls' safety and freedom of movement in public space, and the impact that laws, urban planning, and services alongside new social norms can have in enabling or preventing violence. This will become more pressing to consider as African populations become predominantly urban.

The proliferation of the internet, mobile technologies, and the concurrent use of social media has also seen the rise of new forms of technology-related violence against women (Kee, 2006). This including cyber-harassment and various forms of invasion of privacy and surveillance directly targeting women, using information and communication technologies (ICTs) to enable gendered sexual exploitation, as well as the proliferation of games and other spaces that promote rape culture and allow users to enact violence against women in virtual space (Essof, 2009; Madanda, 2009). Engaging technology-related violence requires developing analysis and approaches to internet governance, and to new duty bearers given that the platforms where the abuse takes place are regulated in the first instance by the private sector technology companies that run them, and not by states (Athar, 2015).

Violence against women is not an inevitable phenomenon. Recent evidence and promising policy and programming shows that prevention is achievable (Michau, 2015). For example, the research trial of the SASA! methodology developed by Raising Voices in Uganda shows that preventing intimate partner violence and related patterns around new HIV infections is possible through community mobilisation that focuses on changing attitudes around gender and power (Abramsky, 2014).



05.

TECHNOLOGICAL TRENDS



Technology penetration in Africa has been growing rapidly and is expected to have massive economic and social impacts, especially on how people live and work. They hold both opportunities and challenges from a women’s rights perspective. The data reveals a complex relationship between gender and use of information and communication technologies (ICT) in Africa, with factors such as income and education level also impacting whether or not a person in Africa has access to and uses the internet, social media, and mobile technologies (Deen-Swarrray, Gillwald, & Morrell, 2013).

5.1 Internet access and use

In global perspective, access to the internet in Africa is still very low (although not the lowest)²⁸. In 2015, 6% of global Internet users came from Africa compared to a high of 48% in Asia and Pacific (UNDP, 2015). Despite this low level of access, African tech innovators have nevertheless made a significant impact in developing new apps and tools that are affecting women’s lives, including mobile money (pioneered in Kenya on the MPesa platform by companies Vodafone, Safaricom, and Vodacom), and Ushahidi crowdmapping software.

As shown in Figure 13, mobile technologies can be quite beneficial including for rural development and agriculture—a sector where many African women participate.

FIGURE 12: OPPORTUNITIES FOR MOBILE APPLICATIONS FOR AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT



²⁸Internet access in the Commonwealth of Independent States is 5% and Middle East is 4% (UNDP, 2015).

5.2 Mobile phone access and use

Mobile phones now facilitate many aspects of development and communication across Africa through a combination of voice calls, SMS, and mobile applications. Mobile phone penetration rates are accelerating rapidly in the developing world—between 2010 and 2015, the growth was 193% (see Table 22). This is attributed to, among other things, new and more affordable handsets, which are becoming increasingly available. Despite the substantial increase in mobile phone access, the disparity in mobile phone ownership is still there. By the end of 2014, ownership of mobile telephones in SSA was highest in West Africa (50%), followed by Southern Africa (45%), then East Africa (41%), and lastly Central Africa, which had only one third of its populations owning mobile phones.

TABLE 21: MOBILE SUBSCRIPTION²⁹ IN 2015

Subscriber Growth	No. of users (Mil) in 2010	No. of users (Mil) in 2015	Proportion of population	% growth btw 2010 & 2015	Projected no. of users (Mil) in 2020	Projected % growth btw 2015 & 2020
SSA	200	386		193	518	134
East African Community (EAC)	36	63	41	175	86	137
The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)	15	43	29	287	79	184
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)	83	163	50	196	216	133
The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)	76	132	45	174	164	124

Source: GSMA, 2015b

TABLE 22: GENDER GAP IN MOBILE OWNERSHIP

Country	Gender gap	% Subscriber penetration		Unconnected population		% Female non-users	% Women non-users who would use a mobile phone if given one	Barriers to connection
		F	M	F	M	F	F	
DRC	33	24	36	76	64	49	93	High handset cost (44%); network quality (42%); credit cost (23%); access to battery charging (23%); technical literacy and confidence (21%)
Kenya	7	41	44	59	56	40	87	Network quality (59%); high handset cost (50%); credit cost (45%); SIM cost (31%); access to battery charging (31%); Agent access (30%)
Niger	45	13	23	87	77	56	95	High handset cost (57%); SIM cost (50%); network quality (39%); credit cost (34%); access to battery charging (33%); technical literacy confidence (30%)
Egypt	2	53	54	47	46	74	52	High handset cost (80%); network quality (75%); security and harassment (53%)

Source: GSMA, 2015a

²⁹EAC has five member states, with a population of 153 million; ECCAS has 10 member states, with a population of 146 million; ECOWAS has 15 member states, with a population of 328 million; SADC has 15 member states, with a population of 295 million

5.2.1 Gender gap in mobile usage

Looking across SSA, **women on average are 14% less likely to own a mobile phone than men (GSMA, 2015)**. In SSA, 307 million women i.e. 64% of women were unconnected.³⁰ There were also wide gender variations in ownership ranging from 2% in Egypt to 45% in Niger (see Table 23).

The unconnected make the bulk of non-users and are more prevalent in some countries than others, with the highest proportion (of both men and women) living in DRC and Niger. Non-users are usually from poorer households, have lower levels of education, and are predominantly women (GSMA, 2015). Even when women own mobile phones, there is a significant gender gap in mobile phone usage, which prevents them from reaping the full benefits of mobile phone ownership (GSMA, 2015). Women report using phones less frequently and intensively than men, especially for more sophisticated services such as mobile internet.

In most countries, fewer women than men who own phones report using messaging and data services beyond voice. Cost remains the greatest barrier overall to owning and using a mobile phone, particularly for women, who often have less financial independence than men.

Security and harassment emerged as one of the top five barriers to mobile phone ownership and usage, and is a key concern for women. Women also cite service delivery issues (network quality and coverage and agent or operator trust) and technical literacy and confidence as key barriers to mobile phone ownership and use. Social norms influence women's access to and use of mobile technology, and often contribute to women experiencing barriers to mobile phone ownership and use more acutely than men.

It is interesting to note, however, that other socio-economic factors affect mobile phone ownership aside from gender. As study of gendered mobile phone use in 12 countries in Africa found that level of education and level of income were more significant factors than gender when it comes to urban dwellers owning a mobile phone. The study found that urban women generally had access to mobile phones if they could afford them, and were not as influenced by gendered social norms around whether they should own phones (Deen-Swarraj, Gillwald, & Morrell, 2013).

TABLE 23: GENDER DISPARITY IN MOBILE USAGE

Country	Mobile phone owners who report never sending an SMS		Mobile phone owners who report never using the internet on a mobile phone		Borrowers of mobile phones by country		Call detail record (CDR) conducted by a leading mobile operator in South Asian countries		
	W	M	W	M	W	M		W	M
DRC	37	22	81	67	6	5	Outbound call per day	0.9	3.6
Kenya	11	9	57	39	7	4	Inbound call per day	2.4	3
Niger	51	44	82	70	19	8	Outbound call duration (minutes)	4.8	3.1
Egypt	5	7	32	32	1	0	Inbound call duration (minutes)	6.4	2.4

Source: GSMA, 2015a

³⁰Unconnected women include those who do not own a mobile phone, but may borrow one.

GENDER AND MOBILE PHONE USE

- Fewer women than men report trying mobile services other than voice.
- Women are moving up the digital ladder at a slower pace. This is demonstrated by the fact that fewer women tend to use mobile internet and other complicated features on their phones than men.
- More women borrow phones than men. This disallows women the full benefits of mobile usage.
- Women generally appear to make and receive fewer calls than men over the same time period. The difference is particularly striking in the number of calls made (outbound calls), with women making 4 times fewer calls than men.
- Women tend to receive more calls than they make. The ratio of inbound/outbound calls made by women was almost 3:1 compared with less than 1:1 for men.
- Women appear to engage in longer calls than men, particularly when comparing the duration of calls received (inbound calls), which are almost 3 times longer for women than for men (see Table 24).

Mobile subscriptions in SSA are projected to grow by 134% between 2015 and 2030 with the highest growth rate is expected in Central Africa and East Africa (see Table 21). However, subscriber growth rates are likely to slow down from 13% to 6% by 2020, which is less than half of the population (49%: GSMA, 2015). Evidently, bringing connectivity to unconnected populations across the region is still a challenge. Mobile connections are however projected to reach 91% of the population from the current 65%. This means that more people will be able to access a mobile network than will be able to access electricity.

Mobile broadband connections are set to increase from just over 20% of the connection base in 2016 to almost 60% by 2020 (GSMA, 2015). There is rapid uptake of smartphones due to reducing prices. **It is estimated that the region will add more than 400 million new smartphone connections by 2020 (GSMA, 2015).**

As the African continent becomes increasingly digital, it is important to track and consider ways of increasing the digital agency of African women and girls within it. This question is closely tied to a digital enabling environment, including women's access to education and to means of earning decent incomes (Kelleher, 2013).

From the vantage point of business, there is an incentive to providing women access to mobile phones. Closing the mobile phone 'gender gap' represents an estimated USD13 billion incremental annual revenue opportunity for mobile operators in low and middle-income countries, with the greatest potential gains in Asia, and Africa (GSMA, 2015).



FEMINIST QUESTIONS

- While evolving mobile phone and internet technologies create opportunities, they have also raised governance questions around enabling state-led surveillance and violations of privacy, as well as new forms of violence against women such as cyber-harassment and bullying. What initiatives and interventions are needed to build questions around women's rights and needs into the design of new ICT tools?

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

The data collated in this publication gives a glimpse into the future for women and girls in Africa. While this information does confirm the gains that have been made so far to lessen the gap, the rights of women to gain equality with men are far from being achieved.

The data suppositions do confirm that some old challenges where women's rights have had the least protection and where men's privilege is most entrenched will remain areas of concern and advocacy into the future. The data also bring to the fore other areas that will metamorphose into new challenges. These require a re-thinking of prioritisation, actions, and investments if we are to work towards a future that is fully just for women in Africa.

Using existing data to make projections about the future of women's rights is a first step. Whereas this definitely makes important pointers for our work, it is not without its challenges. First, it is clear that the data available lacks important parameters that are essential in widening and deepening the scope of analysis beyond what is in this publication. The lack of qualitative parameters or even contextual reflection of the numbers presented, for example, limits the inferences that can be made about a certain variable beyond its quantitative attribute. As mentioned at the beginning, what is publicly available is also biased by what is perceived to be important for public policy. It therefore excludes 'private domain data' that is critical and fundamentally central to this kind of analysis. Second, the need to use multiple sources of data itself creates a difficulty in generating a consistent analysis across the document (an example being that not all datasets focused on Africa include north Africa). Third, the use of a wide range of datasets makes it hard to control for inherent biases that may have occurred when the primary data was collected.

With an on-going commitment to shaping Africa's future using foresight analysis, there is a need for feminist researchers and statisticians from Africa and the broader world to influence the formulation of statistical questions. This entails posing questions that are missing in existing data, refining definitions to fully account for women's experiences of and contribution to different sectors of life and activity, and advocating for consistent collection, collation, and analysis of data to use in understanding the present and planning for the future.

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08.

APPENDICES



APPENDIX A: AGE COMPOSITION OF AFRICA'S POPULATION BETWEEN 2015 AND 2030

TABLE 24: AGE COMPOSITION OF AFRICA'S POPULATION BETWEEN 2015 AND 2030

Age group	2015 ('000)	Total cohort (2015)	Proportion of total cohort	2030 ('000)	Total cohort (2030)	Proportion of total cohort	% Increase in total population btw 2015 & 2030	% change btw the proportion of the pop in 2015 & 2030
0-4	185,176	485,979	41	226,209	626,757	37	29	-4
05-09	160,840			207,903				
10-14	139,963			192,645				
15 - 19	122,104	406,286	34	176,883	579,056	34	43	0
20 - 24	107,514			154,515				
25 - 29	95,196			133,016				
30 - 34	81,472			114,642				
35 - 39	66,505	252,431	21	100,058	404,412	24	60	3
40 - 44	53,492			87,782				
45 - 49	43,683			74,193				
50 - 54	36,307			59,511				
55 - 59	29,479			46,557				
60 - 64	22,965			36,311				
65+	41,481	41,481	3	68,938	68,938	4	66	1
	1,186,177	1,186,177	100	1,679,163	1,679,163	100		

Source: UN, world population prospects, 2015

APPENDIX B: PROPORTION OF WOMEN IN NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS IN AFRICA BETWEEN 2011 AND 2015

TABLE 25: PROPORTION OF WOMEN IN NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS IN AFRICA BETWEEN 2011 AND 2015

Region	Country	Seats*	Women	% W	Seats*	Women	% W
East Africa							
	Rwanda	80	51	63.80%	26	10	38.50%
	Seychelles	32	14	43.80%	---	---	---
	Ethiopia	547	212	38.80%	153	49	32.00%
	United Republic of Tanzania	372	136	36.60%	---	---	---
	Burundi	121	44	36.40%	43	18	41.90%
	Uganda	427	143	33.50%	---	---	---
	South Sudan	383	109	28.50%	50	6	12.00%
	Eritrea	150	33	22.00%	---	---	---
	Madagascar	151	31	20.50%	63	12	19.00%
	Kenya	350	69	19.70%	68	18	26.50%
	Somalia	275	38	13.80%	---	---	---
	Djibouti	55	7	12.70%	---	---	---
	Comoros	33	1	3.00%	---	---	---
	Mauritius	69	8	11.60%	---	---	---
Southern Africa							
	South Africa	393	164	41.70%	54	19	35.20%
	Namibia	104	43	41.30%	42	10	23.80%
	Mozambique	250	99	39.60%	---	---	---
	Zimbabwe	270	85	31.50%	80	38	47.50%
	Lesotho	120	30	25.00%	33	8	24.20%
	Malawi	192	32	16.70%	---	---	---
	Zambia	167	30	18.00%	---	---	---
	Swaziland	65	4	6.20%	30	10	33.30%
	Botswana	63	6	9.50%	---	---	0
Central Africa							
	Angola	220	81	36.80%	---	---	---
	Cameroon	180	56	31.10%	100	20	20.00%
	Democratic Republic of the Congo	492	44	8.90%	108	5	4.60%
	Congo	136	10	7.40%	72	14	19.40%

TABLE 25 (CONTD): PROPORTION OF WOMEN IN NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS IN AFRICA BETWEEN 2011 AND 2015

Region	Country	Seats*	Women	% W	Seats*	Women	% W
Central Africa							
	Chad	188	28	14.90%	---	---	---
	Central African Republic	139	10	7.20%	---	---	---
	Equatorial Guinea	100	24	24.00%	73	10	13.70%
	Gabon	120	17	14.20%	99	18	18.20%
	Sao Tome and Principe	55	10	18.20%	---	---	---
North Africa							
	Algeria	462	146	31.60%	143	10	7.00%
	Tunisia	217	68	31.30%	---	---	---
	Morocco	395	67	17.00%	120	14	11.70%
	Libya	188	30	16.00%	---	---	---
	Sudan	426	130	30.50%	54	19	35.20%
	Egypt	596	89	14.90%	---	---	---
	Total			141.30%			53.90%
	Average			23.55%			18
West Africa							
	Senegal	150	64	42.70%	---	---	---
	Mauritania	147	37	25.20%	56	8	14.30%
	Cape Verde	72	17	23.60%	---	---	---
	Guinea	114	25	21.90%	---	---	---
	Togo	91	16	17.60%	---	---	---
	Niger	171	25	14.60%	---	---	---
	Guinea-Bissau	102	14	13.70%	---	---	---
	Sierra Leone	121	15	12.40%	---	---	---
	Liberia	73	8	11.00%	30	3	10.00%
	Ghana	275	30	10.90%	---	---	---
	Burkina Faso	127	12	9.40%	---	---	---
	Gambia	53	5	9.40%	---	---	---
	Cote d'Ivoire	251	23	9.20%	---	---	---
	Mali	147	13	8.80%	---	---	---
	Benin	83	6	7.20%	---	---	---
	Nigeria	360	20	5.60%	108	7	6.50%

Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union [IPU], 2016

APPENDIX C: PERCENTAGE WOMEN REPRESENTATION IN MINISTERIAL POSITIONS IN AFRICA (2012 AND 2015)

TABLE 26: PERCENTAGE WOMEN REPRESENTATION IN MINISTERIAL POSITIONS IN AFRICA (2012 AND 2015)

African regions	Aggregate/Country	Ministerial positions (2012)	Ministerial positions (2015)	Change between 2012 and 2015
East Africa	Rwanda	32	35.5	3.5
	Seychelles	22.2	25	2.8
	Ethiopia	9.7	12.5	2.8
	United Republic of Tanzania	27.6	32.3	4.7
	Burundi	34.8	34.8	0
	Uganda	32.1	29.6	-2.5
	South Sudan	16.7	22.7	6
	Eritrea	23.5	16.7	-6.8
	Madagascar	26.5	20	-6.5
	Kenya	15.4	30	14.6
	Somalia	5.6	8	2.4
	Djibouti		5.3	5.3
	Sudan	9.1	15.2	6.1
	Comoros	20	20	0
Mauritius	8	12	4	
Southern Africa	South Africa	40	41.7	1.7
	Namibia	22.7	21.7	-1
	Lesotho	36.8	21.7	-15.1
	Botswana		12.5	
	Mozambique	27.6	28.6	1
	Swaziland	23.8	26.3	2.5
	Malawi	21.1	11.1	-10
	Zambia	11.8	20	8.2
	Zimbabwe	13.5	11.5	-2
Central Africa	Angola	29	22.2	-6.8
	Cameroon	14	14	0
	Democratic Republic of the Congo	13.5	8.1	-5.4
	Congo		10.5	
	Chad	12.1	13.6	1.5
	Central African Republic	20.7	24.1	3.4
	Equatorial Guinea		8.7	8.7
	Gabon	14.3	12.5	-1.8
	Sao Tome and Principe	9.1	7.7	-1.4

Source: Hiraga & Maega, 2014 and Inter-Parliamentary Union [IPU], 2015

TABLE 26 (CONTD.): PERCENTAGE WOMEN REPRESENTATION IN MINISTERIAL POSITIONS IN AFRICA (2012 AND 2015)

African regions	Aggregate/Country	Ministerial positions (2012)	Ministerial positions (2015)	Change between 2012 and 2015
North Africa	Algeria		20	
	Tunisia		10.5	
	Morocco		15.8	
	Egypt		11.8	
West Africa	Senegal	25	20	-5
	Mauritania	11.5	26.9	15.4
	Cape Verde	47.1		
	Guinea	12.9	14.7	1.8
	Togo	22.6	20.7	-1.9
	Niger	26.1	12.9	-13.2
	Guinea-Bissau	18.8	31.3	12.5
	Sierra Leone	7.7	6.9	-0.8
	Liberia	22.7	20	-2.7
	Ghana	18.4	23.1	4.7
	Burkina Faso	12	12.5	0.5
	Gambia	31.3	21.1	-10.2
	Cote d'Ivoire	13.9	16.7	2.8
	Mali	13.8	16.1	2.3
	Benin	30.8	14.8	-16
	Nigeria	28.1	24.1	-4

Source: Hiraga & Maega, 2014 and Inter-Parliamentary Union [IPU], 2015

APPENDIX D: INDICATORS BASED ON CONSTITUTIONS, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS, AND STATUTES IN EFFECT AS OF JUNE 2011

TABLE 27: INDICATORS BASED ON CONSTITUTIONS, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS, AND STATUTES IN EFFECT AS OF JUNE 2011

	Legal system	Features of the Constitution	Legal capacity of men and women	Administration of property within marriage	Division of property upon divorce	Land rights	Features of the Constitution	Restrictions on and Protection of Women's Labour Rights
		Explicitly provides for gender equality in property ownership	Wife requires husband's permission to open bank account	Husband must gain wife's consent in managing marital property	Marital property is divided equally upon divorce	Women's land rights are granted statutory protection under land laws	Recognizes equal rights to work, right to equal pay for work of equal value, or both	Statutory protection is granted to equal pay for work of equal value
East Africa								
Comoros	Civil	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Eritrea	Civil	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Ethiopia	Civil	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Kenya	Common	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Madagascar	Civil	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Mauritius	Civil	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Rwanda	Civil	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Seychelles	Common	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Somalia	Civil	No	N/A	N/A	N/a	No	No	N/A
Uganda	Common	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
United Republic of Tanzania	Common	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Total		2/11	0/11	2/11	4/11	6/11	2/11	6/11
Central Africa								
Burundi	Civil	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Cameroon	Civil	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Central African Republic	Civil	No	No	Yes	N/a	Yes	No	Yes
Chad	Civil	No	No	N/A	Yes	No	No	Yes
Congo, Rep.	Civil	No	No	Yes	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Civil	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Equatorial Guinea	Civil	No	No	N/A	No	No	No	Yes
Gabon	Civil	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Sao Tome and Principe	Civil	N/A	N/A	No	Yes	N/A	N/A	Yes
Total		0/9	2/9	5/9	4/9	2/9	0/9	9/9

Source: Driemeier, M.H. and Hasan, T., 2013

NOTE: Data was unavailable in this source from Djibouti, South Sudan and North Africa

TABLE 27 (CONTD.): INDICATORS BASED ON CONSTITUTIONS, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS, AND STATUTES IN EFFECT AS OF JUNE 2011

	Legal system	Features of the Constitution	Legal capacity of men and women	Administration of property within marriage	Division of property upon divorce	Land rights	Features of the Constitution	Restrictions on and Protection of Women's Labour Rights
		Explicitly provides for gender equality in property ownership	Wife requires husband's permission to open bank account	Husband must gain wife's consent in managing marital property	Marital property is divided equally upon divorce	Women's land rights are granted statutory protection under land laws	Recognizes equal rights to work, right to equal pay for work of equal value, or both	Statutory protection is granted to equal pay for work of equal value
Southern Africa								
Angola	Civil	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Botswana	Common	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Lesotho	Common	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Malawi	Common	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mozambique	Civil	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Namibia	Common	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
South Africa	Common	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Swaziland	Common	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Zambia	Common	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Zimbabwe	Common	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Total		3/10	2/10	3/10	5/10	7/10	3/10	7/10
West Africa								
Benin	Civil	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Burkina Faso	Civil	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Cape Verde	Civil	No	Yes	No	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
Cote d'Ivoire	Civil	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Gambia, The	Common	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Ghana	Common	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Guinea	Civil	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Guinea-Bissau	Civil	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Liberia	Common	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Mali	Civil	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Niger	Civil	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Nigeria	Common	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Senegal	Civil	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Sierra Leone	Common	No	No	No	No	No	No	N/A
Togo	Civil	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Total		3/15	4/15	4/15	5/15	5/15	3/15	12/15

Source: Driemeier, M.H. and Hasan, T., 2013

NOTE: Data was unavailable in this source from Djibouti, South Sudan and North Africa

