Tag: Governance

[tp lang=”en” not_in=”fr”]Semiha Abdulmelik is one of the two women AWDF sponsored for the African Leadership Centre’s Peace and Security Fellowship for African Women. To learn more about Semiha click here. This article was cross-posted from Strife and the African Leadership Centre.

29th January 2015

‘Meaningful participation in African conflict-resolution processes is not an important aspect of China’s current Africa relations. China is becoming increasingly important in the landscape of African politics, including in conflict-affected theatres, but is not as significant an actor as external perceptions contend. Nor has the Chinese government shown any particular inclination for more active engagement beyond spheres such as Sudan where the need is more compelling’’.[1]

Dan Large (SOAS), 2008, in China’s role in the mediation and resolution of conflict in Africa.

These words, written just seven years ago, now seem out of date. We are now witnessing what might be described as a significant if incremental evolution in China’s involvement in Africa’s peace and security. It is more structured, purposeful, and beyond countries of immediate interest, if still exploratory.

China’s peace and security engagement on the continent has predominantly been characterised as driven by economic interests in countries in which it has significant investments. This is the narrative most commonly seen in the Western media and academia: strict adherence to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of countries and comprising of bi-lateral military cooperation and arms trade. How this has evolved will be the focus of this piece.

With China’s increasing focus on its global power and the associated reputational risks, as well as the emerging realities of its deepening political engagement in Africa, a number of defining shifts can be observed. China’s concerted efforts to resolve the South Sudanese conflict is a case in point. China has dispatched its Special Representative for African Affairs, Zhong Jianhua, to conduct shuttle diplomacy, support the Inter-governmental Authority on Development’s (IGAD) efforts, and create forums for dialogue between the parties.[2] He noted that China’s meeting with South Sudanese opposition was ‘pretty dramatic for us. I think for the last two or three decades we were quite rigid about non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries… this is a typical domestic conflict. Usually when this happens, we try to avoid making direct contact with the opposition because, to some extent we think, it’s a rebel force. When you talk to a rebel force that means stepping into internal affairs.’ [3]

But Chinese mediation efforts in South Sudan suggest that China is reconsidering its long-standing belief in ership Cennon-interference as part of its commitment to support peace and security in Africa.[4] This change comes from an understanding that it is essential for the achievement of its development policy and goals in Africa that there be peace and security.

Interestingly, Jiahua was also clear that China did not have the academic or analytical expertise to understand internal African conflicts.[5] Indeed, China’s approach has been less about a nuanced understanding of the conflict dynamics but a kind of ‘oil diplomacy’ grounded in its ability to appeal to the economic rationale and incentives of the warring parties.[6] In this regard, the Chinese government is currently promoting African Studies[7i] in its academic and research institutions – pointing to the growing importance of non-state (academic/research) linkages between China and Africa in mediating and informing this growing engagement.[8]

In contrast to Sudan and South Sudan, where China has a significant economic presence, and hence more evident engagement in conflict mediation efforts, there are other parts of Africa where China does not have the same immediate interests yet is still involved in fostering peace and security. In Mali, China has contributed over 500 military troops to the UN peacekeeping mission (a quarter of its total UN troop contributions).[9] This is significant because China does not often deploy military personnel; previously it had only deployed logistical and medical personnel.[10] Interestingly, given the lack of significant Chinese interests in the country, Chinese efforts appear more in pursuit of broader regional stability where it has varied interests.

This attention to China’s role in UN peacekeeping in Africa suggests that China is now placing greater emphasis on multilateral approaches to peace and security partnerships in Africa. While this has often been seen by Chinese commentators and others following Chinese foreign policy[11] as an attempt by China to consolidate its ascendancy as a global power, this involvement has arguably been ‘evolving in an open-ended way’.[12] China has, for instance, proven more progressive in supporting the use of force to protect civilians in through the UN mission in the DRC while at the same time continuing its traditional resistance to the establishment of a human rights office for the UN mission in Sudan.[13]

China’s increasingly multilateral approach to peace and security cooperation in Africa is not only through the UN but also through regional organizations – the African Union (AU) in particular. The admission of the African Union Commission in October 2011 as a full member of the Forum of China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) has undoubtedly paved the way from more concrete cooperation in the area of peace and security between China and the African Union (AU).

Three years later, the Government of China and the AU co-launched the AU-China Strategic Dialogue for Peace and Security in Africa.[14] This regional multilateral cooperation is predicated on two pillars. Firstly, financial and technical support for various aspects of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), including AU peace support operations and mechanisms such as the African Standby Force and African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises. Secondly, cooperation at an international level, particularly on African positions at the UN Security Council and on UN Security Council reform.

Chris Alden, one of the few writers to analyse China’s multilateral engagement with the African Union on peace and security issues, argues that China’s desire for more systematic and institutionalized cooperation on peace and security in Africa is in tension with Chinese foreign policy principles and economic interests. This is particularly so given the underlying normative basis for APSA, namely the principle of non-indifference and provision for intervention in Member States.[15] As such, he sees three emerging ways in which China could engage with the APSA, all of which it already exhibits to varying degrees: as architects (through the formulation of new or refinement of existing foreign policy and security norms); builders (through participation in multilateral security and peacekeeping operations); and/or as subcontractors (through offering specific and time-bound solutions for security challenges) of the APSA.[16]

It is clear that China’s engagement in Africa’s peace and security has evolved, both with regards to its principles of engagement, geographic scope, and institutional interlocutors. As Alden’s exploratory research has indicated, there will continue to be interest – and a research agenda – in seeing how this evolves further and consolidates in the long-term with regards to Chinese foreign policy. Of further interest will be how this plays out in international efforts to secure peace and security in Africa, from possible tensions or cooperation between the West – Africa’s traditional peace and security partner – and China, to UN Security Council level reforms. Yet what is missing and crucial is African perspectives and experiences: this should preoccupy the new generation of African academics and researchers.

Semiha Abdulmelik is currently a Fellow at the African Leadership Centre in Kenya. Her research interests include humanitarian diplomacy, regional organizations, post-conflict reconstruction, and the security dynamics of the Horn. You can follow her on Twitter at @SAbdulmelik.

NOTES

[1] Large, D. (2008), China’s role in the mediation and resolution of conflict in Africa, Oslo Forum Network of Mediators, accessed at http://www.hdcentre.org/uploads/tx_news/20DanLargeChinainAfricaWEB.pdf, pp. 35-41. China’s significant resource interests in Sudan, including its substantial economic investment, presence of nationals and oil operations and facilities, particularly in Darfur, has put the Sudan conflict and its resolution as a top interest for the Chinese government.

[2] China to hold consultative conference on South Sudan in Khartoum, Sudan Tribune, January 6, 2015 accessed at http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article53569

[3] Fabricius, P. (2014), China plays mediator in Africa, The Sunday Independent, November 2, 2014, accessed at http://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/china-plays-peacemaker-in-africa-1.1774195#.VK0zOyuUcT8

[4] Indeed, Chinese officials have been quick to point to the Chinese commitment during the 2012 Forum of China-African Cooperation (FOCAC) to do more in the area of peace and security in Africa.

[5] Ibid

[6] Fabricius, P. (2014). In Fabricius’s interview with him, Jiahua admits that that he does not know the triggers for the South Sudanese civil war or who is to blame. Instead the approach has been to reiterate what was conveyed to both parties when oil production was shut down in 2012. “I persuaded them that this is the most important property not only of the government but also of the people of South Sudan. Look at this country; the biggest, the most important for the survival of the people is this oilfield. For some like Large (2008) however, this is an indication to a lesser degree of China’s lack of experience in ‘applied conflict resolution’ and more a demonstration of China engaging on ‘its own terms for its own ends’.

[7] Ibid

[8] China-Africa scholarly exchanges and fora are not new. These are long-standing and have historical links to state-sponsored efforts to support communist Africa states. However, this was largely focused on technical areas such as agriculture and engineering. This concerted state effort to strengthen China’s knowledge and analytical capacity in the area of Africa’s peace and security, as well as non-state efforts to build linkages between Chinese and African researchers and institutions, such as Fahamu’s Emerging Powers Programme, are indicative of shifts that respond to current realities in the China-Africa relationship.

[9] http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml

[10] Cordano, D. (2014), China’s role in Africa’s conflicts: Military cooperation, arms transfers and involvement in peacekeeping operations, 11 April, Consultancy Africa Intelligence, accessed at http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1672:chinas-role-in-africas-conflicts-military-cooperation-arms-transfers-and-involvement-in-peacekeeping-operations&catid=60:conflict-terrorism-discussion-papers&Itemid=265

[11] Wong, C. (2013), China Embraces Peacekeeping Missions, The Diplomat, August 9, accessed at http://thediplomat.com/2013/08/china-embraces-peacekeeping-missions/

[12] Fabricius, P. (2014),

[13] Cordano, D. (2014)

[14] http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/commissioner-chergui-concludes-official-visit-to-china-launches-au-china-strategic-dialogue-for-peace-and-security-in-africa

[15] Alden, C. (2014), China’s evolving approach to the African Peace and Security Architecture, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, accessed at http://www.saiia.org.za/news/chinas-evolving-approach-to-the-african-peace-and-security-architecture

[16] Ibid[/tp]

[tp lang=”fr” not_in=”en”]Semiha Abdulmelik est l’une des deux femmes d’AWDF parrainée pour la paix et la sécurité par la bourse du Centre africain pour le leaderschip des femmes africaines. Pour en savoir plus sur Semiha cliquez ici. Cet article a été publié pour Strife et le Centre de leadership africain.

29th Janvier 2015

“La participation significative dans les processus de résolution des conflits africains n’est pas un aspect important des relations actuelles de la Chine en Afrique. La Chine est de plus en plus importante dans le paysage de la politique africaine, y compris dans les régions théâtre de conflits, mais pas un acteur aussi important que le soutiennent les perceptions externes . Le gouvernement chinois n’a pas non plus montré d’inclination particulière pour un engagement plus actif au-delà des domaines tels que le Soudan, où le besoin est le plus convaincant ”. [1]

Dan Large (SOAS), 2008, dans le rôle de la Chine dans la médiation et la résolution des conflits en Afrique.

Ces mots, écrits il y a seulement sept ans, semblent aujourd’hui dépassés. Nous assistons aujourd’hui à ce qui pourrait être décrit comme une évolution incrémentale si importante dans l’implication de la Chine dans la paix et la sécurité de l’Afrique. Elle est plus structurée, déterminée, et au-delà des pays d’intérêt immédiat, elle est encore exploratoire.

L’engagement de la Chine sur le continent pour la paix et la sécurité a surtout été caractérisé comme dictée par des intérêts économiques dans les pays dans lesquels elle a des investissements importants. Ceci est le récit le plus souvent vu dans les médias occidentaux et le monde universitaire: le strict respect du principe de non-ingérence dans les affaires intérieures des pays et comprenant de la coopération militaire et le commerce des armes bi-latérale. Comment a évolué cela sera le thème de ce papier.

Avec l’augmentation de l’accent de la Chine sur sa puissance mondiale et les risques de réputation associés, ainsi que les nouvelles réalités de l’approfondissement de son engagement politique en Afrique, un certain nombre de changements peuvent être observés. Les efforts concertés de la Chine pour résoudre le conflit du Sud-Soudan est un cas d’école. La Chine a envoyé son représentant spécial pour les affaires africaines, Zhong Jianhua, de faire la navette diplomatique, soutenir l’Autorité intergouvernementale pour les efforts de développement(IGAD), et créer des espaces de dialogue entre les parties. [2] Il a noté que la réunion de la Chine avec l’opposition au Sud-soudan était «assez dramatique pour nous. Je pense que pour les deux ou trois dernières décennies, nous étions assez rigide sur la non-ingérence dans les affaires intérieures des autres pays … ceci est un conflit interne typique. Habituellement, lorsque cela se produit, nous essayons d’éviter tout contact direct avec l’opposition parce que, dans une certaine mesure, nous pensons, il est une force rebelle. Lorsque vous parlez à une force rebelle qui implique une intervention dans les affaires intérieures ». [3]

Mais les efforts de médiation chinois au Soudan du Sud suggèrent que la Chine est en train de reconsidérer sa conviction de longue date dans le partenariat Cennon-ingérence dans le cadre de son engagement à soutenir la paix et la sécurité en Afrique. [4] Ce changement provient d’une compréhension qui est essentielle pour la réalisation de sa politique et ses objectifs de développement en Afrique afin qu’il y ait la paix et la sécurité.

Fait intéressant, pour Jiahua était également clair que la Chine n’a pas l’expertise académique ou analytique pour comprendre les conflits africains internes. [5] En effet, l’approche de la Chine a été moins sur une compréhension nuancée de la dynamique du conflit, que sur une sorte de «diplomatie pétrolière» fondée sur sa capacité de faire appel à la logique économique et les incitations des parties belligérantes [6] À cet égard, le gouvernement chinois est en train de promouvoir des études africaines [7i] dans ses institutions universitaires et de recherche -. soulignant l’importance croissante de non-étatique ( universitaire / recherche) les liens entre la Chine et l’Afrique dans la médiation et de l’informer d’un engagement croissant. [8]

En revanche au Soudan et au Sud-Soudan, où la Chine a une présence économique importante, et l’engagement donc plus évident dans les efforts de médiation des conflits, il y a d’autres parties de l’Afrique où la Chine n’a pas les mêmes intérêts immédiats et est toujours impliqué dans la promotion de la paix et de la sécurité . Au Mali, la Chine a contribué avec plus de 500 troupes militaires à la mission de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies (un quart du total des contributions en troupes de l’ONU) [9] Ceci est important parce que la Chine ne déploie pas souvent le personnel militaire. Auparavant, elle avait seulement déployé du personnel logistique et médical. [10] Il est intéressant, étant donné le manque d’intérêt chinois pour le pays, les efforts chinois semblent plus à la poursuite de la stabilité régionale plus large où il a varié ses intérêts.

Cette attention au rôle de la Chine dans le maintien de la paix des Nations Unies en Afrique suggère que la Chine met désormais davantage l’accent sur les approches multilatérales, les partenariats de paix et de sécurité en Afrique. Même si cela a souvent été perçu par les commentateurs chinois, d’autres suivent la politique étrangère chinoise [11] comme une tentative de la Chine de consolider son emprise comme une puissance mondiale, cette participation a sans doute été «l’évolution d’une manière ouverte». [12] La Chine s’est, par exemple, révélée plus progressive pour soutenir l’utilisation de la force pour protéger les civils en travers de la mission de l’ONU en RDC, tout en continuant en même temps sa résistance traditionnelle à la création d’un bureau des droits de l’homme pour la mission de l’ONU au Soudan. [13]

L’approche plus multilatérale de la Chine à la paix et à la coopération de la sécurité en Afrique se fait non seulement à travers l’ONU, mais aussi par les organisations régionales – l’Union africaine (UA) en particulier. L’admission de la Commission de l’Union africaine en Octobre 2011 en tant que membre à part entière du Forum sino-africain de coopération (FOCAC) a sans aucun doute ouvert la voie du renforcement de la coopération concrète dans le domaine de la paix et la sécurité entre la Chine et l’Union africaine (UA) .

Trois ans plus tard, le gouvernement de la Chine et de l’UA ont co-lancé le Dialogue stratégique de l’UA-Chine pour la paix et la sécurité en Afrique. [14] Cette coopération multilatérale régionale repose sur deux piliers. Tout d’abord, le soutien financier et technique pour les divers aspects de la paix et la sécurité de l’Afrique de l’Architecture (APSA), y compris les opérations de l’UA de maintien de la paix et des mécanismes tels que la Force africaine en attente et des capacités en Afrique pour une réponse immédiate aux situations de crise. Deuxièmement, la coopération au niveau international, en particulier sur les positions de l’Afrique au Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU et sur la réforme du Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU.

Chris Alden, un des rares écrivains à analyser l’engagement multilatéral de la Chine avec l’Union africaine sur les questions de paix et de sécurité, fait valoir que le désir de la Chine d’une coopération plus systématique et institutionnalisée sur la paix et la sécurité en Afrique est en tension avec les principes de la politique étrangère chinoise et les intérêts économiques . Cela est particulièrement vrai étant donné la base normative sous-jacente de l’APSA, à savoir le principe de non-indifférence et la fourniture d’une intervention dans les États membres. [15] En tant que tel, il voit trois manières émergents dans lesquels la Chine pourrait engager avec l’APSA, qui tous il présente déjà à des degrés divers: les architectes (grâce à la formulation de la nouvelle ou le perfectionnement de la politique étrangère et les normes de sécurité existantes); constructeurs (à travers la participation à des opérations multilatérales de maintien de la paix et de la sécurité); et / ou en tant que sous-traitants (par le biais de l’offre de solutions spécifiques et limités dans le temps pour les défis de sécurité) de l’APSA. [16]

Il est clair que l’engagement de la Chine dans la paix et la sécurité de l’Afrique a évolué, tant au niveau de ses principes d’engagement, sa portée géographique, et des interlocuteurs institutionnels. Comme la recherche exploratoire d’Alden l’a indiqué, il y aura toujours des intérêts – et un programme de recherche – à voir comment cela évolue encore et se consolide dans le long terme en ce qui concerne la politique étrangère chinoise. De plus l’intérêt sera de savoir comment cela se joue dans les efforts internationaux pour assurer la paix et la sécurité en Afrique, à partir de possibles tensions ou de la coopération entre l’Occident – partenaire traditionnel pour la paix et la sécurité de l’Afrique – et la Chine, qui à des réformes au niveau du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies. Pourtant, ce qui manque et qui est crucial ce sont des perspectives et des expériences africaines: cela devrait préoccuper la nouvelle génération d’universitaires et chercheurs africains.

Semiha Abdulmelik est actuellement chercheur au Centre de leadership africain au Kenya. Ses intérêts de recherche portent sur la diplomatie humanitaire, les organisations régionales, la reconstruction post-conflit, et la dynamique de la sécurité de la Corne. Vous pouvez la suivre sur Twitter àSAbdulmelik.

NOTES

[1] Large, D. (2008), le rôle de la Chine dans la médiation et la résolution des conflits en Afrique, Forum d’Oslo réseau de médiateurs, accessible à http://www.hdcentre.org/uploads/tx_news/20DanLargeChinainAfricaWEB.pdf, pp . 35-41. Importantes ressources intérêts de la Chine au Soudan, y compris son investissement économique important, la présence des ressortissants et des opérations de pétrole et des installations, en particulier au Darfour, a mis le conflit du Soudan et sa résolution comme un intérêt supérieur pour le gouvernement chinois.

[2] La Chine tiendra une conférence consultative sur le Sud-Soudan à Khartoum, Sudan Tribune 6 Janvier 2015 consultée au http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article53569

[3] Fabricius, P. (2014), la Chine joue un médiateur en Afrique, Le Sunday Independent, le 2 Novembre 2014, consultée au http://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/china-plays-peacemaker-in- africa-1.1774195 # .VK0zOyuUcT8

[4] En effet, les autorités chinoises ont été prompts à souligner l’engagement chinois lors du Forum 2012 de la Chine-Afrique de coopération (FOCAC) de faire davantage dans le domaine de la paix et la sécurité en Afrique.

[5] Ibid

[6] Fabricius, P. (2014). Dans l’interview avec Fabricius, Jiahua admet que ce qu’il ne connaît pas les éléments déclencheurs de la guerre civile soudanaise du Sud ou qui est à blâmer. Au lieu de cela l’approche a été de réitérer ce qui a été transmis aux deux parties lors de la production de pétrole qui a été fermée en 2012. «Je les ai persuadé que c’est la propriété la plus importante non seulement du gouvernement mais aussi du peuple du Sud-Soudan. Regardez ce pays; le plus grand, le plus important pour la survie du peuple est ce champ pétrolifère. Pour certains, comme Grand (2008) Toutefois, cela est une indication à un degré moindre, du manque d’expérience de la Chine appliquée la résolution des conflits »et plus une démonstration de la Chine sur les« engageant ses propres termes pour ses propres fins ».

[7] Ibid

[8] les échanges et les forums scientifiques sino-africains ne sont pas nouveaux. Il se font de longue date et ont des liens historiques avec les efforts parrainés par l’État pour soutenir les communistes Afrique États. Toutefois, cela est en grande partie axées sur les domaines techniques tels que l’agriculture et de l’ingénierie. Cet effort de l’Etat concerté pour renforcer la Chine connaissances et la capacité d’analyse dans le domaine de la paix et la sécurité de l’Afrique, ainsi que les efforts de non-État pour construire des liens entre les chercheurs et les institutions chinoises et africaines, tels que le Programme puissances émergentes Fahamu, sont révélateurs de changements qui répondre aux réalités actuelles de la relation Chine-Afrique.

[9] http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml

[10] Cordano, D. (2014), le rôle de la Chine dans les conflits en Afrique: la coopération militaire, les transferts d’armes et participation à des opérations de maintien de la paix, le 11 Avril, Consultance Africa Intelligence, accessible à http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1672:chinas-role-in-africas-conflicts-military-cooperation-arms-transfers-and-involvement-in-peacekeeping-operations&catid=60:conflict-terrorism-discussion-papers&Itemid=265

[11] Wong, C. (2013), la Chine embrasse les missions de maintien de la paix, le diplomate, le 9 août, consultée au http://thediplomat.com/2013/08/china-embraces-peacekeeping-missions/

[12] Fabricius, P. (2014),

[13] Cordano, D. (2014)

[14] http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/commissioner-chergui-concludes-official-visit-to-china-launches-au-china-strategic-dialogue-for-peace-and-security-in-africa

[15] Alden, C. (2014), l’approche évolutive de la Chine à l’architecture africaine de paix et de sécurité, Centre norvégien des ressources consolidation de la paix, accessible à http://www.saiia.org.za/news/chinas-evolving-approach-to -les-africain de la paix et la sécurité à l’architecture

[16] Ibid

[tp lang=”en” not_in=”fr”]In 2013, AWDF awarded a multi-year grant of US$90,000 over 3 years to the African Leadership Centre to strengthen women’s leadership and representation in peace building processes on the African continent.

The African Leadership Centre (ALC), based in Nairobi, Kenya, was established as an educational trust under Kenyan law in partnership with King’s College London and the University of Nairobi. One of its core programmes is the Peace and Security Fellowship for African Women, which brings together African women at the early stages of their careers, to undertake a carefully designed training programme in Leadership, Development and Security.

As part of the AWDF grant, 2 African women, Grace Kilonzi (Kenya) and Semiha Abdulmelik (Ethiopia), have been sponsored to participate in ALC’s 2014-2015 Peace and Security Fellowship programme. The programme, which takes place at the ALC and King’s College London, is designed to expose young professional African women to the complexities of conflict, security and development to equip them for careers in the field.[/tp]

[tp lang=”fr” not_in=”en”]En 2013, AWDF reçu une subvention pluriannuelle de 90.000 $ sur 3 ans pour le Centre de leadership africain pour renforcer le leadership et la représentation des femmes dans les processus de consolidation de la paix sur le continent africain.

Le Centre africain de leadership (ALC), basé à Nairobi, au Kenya, a été établi en tant que fiducie en vertu de la loi kenyane éducative en partenariat avec le King’s College de Londres et l’Université de Nairobi. Un de ces programmes de base est la bourse ‘Paix et Sécurité pour les femmes africaines’, qui regroupe les femmes africaines dans les premiers stades de leur carrière, afin d’entreprendre un programme de formation soigneusement conçu en leadership, développement et sécurité.

Dans le cadre de la subvention AWDF, 2 femmes africaines, grâce Kilonzi (Kenya) et Semiha Abdulmelik (Ethiopie), ont été parrainées pour participer en 2014-2015 au programme de bourses ‘Paix et Sécurité’ de la SLA. Le programme, qui se déroule à l’ALC et au King’s College de Londres, est conçu pour exposer les jeunes femmes africaines professionnelles de la complexité des conflits, de la sécurité et du développement pour les équiper pour une carrière dans le domaine.[/tp]

Click for Grace‘s full profile

Click for Semiha‘s full profile

Read more about Grace

I spent the first three days of this week attending the African Women’s Development Fund’s (AWDF) third Chief Executive Officer’s Forum at the Crowne Plaza Hotel here in Nairobi. The CEO Forum brings together leaders in women’s organizations that work with AWDF.

I admit it, I had no idea what to expect. Yes I had received the program in advance. Yes, I’ve heard of many of the women previously. Maybe even worked with one or two of their organisations. And yes, like me all of these women are African feminists. But but but…there was also a key difference. I am self-employed and in a very practical way, whatever actions I take regarding my advocacy on women’s issues is my own decision and often affects only me. These women, leaders in their own organizations, take actions that impact other women in ways I could never even begin to do.

I knew that I would meet a woman who is pushing to get more African stories by African writers for African children on the continent – my younger sister Deborah Ahenkorah of Golden Baobab.

I had Googled the women training women in politics and those looking out for the rights of young women too often under threat from patriarchy through forced marriages and payment of fines to parents (mostly fathers) where girls have been raped instead of prosecution – Mawusi Awity, Amy Oyekunle, Yvette Kathurima.

I would meet the amazing food microbiologist and retired Dean of Science from the University of Botswana who I planned to ambush to become my son’s newly adopted grandmother, Professor Sesae Mpuchane who is also the Chair of the AWDF Board.

And the legends in Afro feminist circles – Mary Rusimbi, Sarah Mukasa and Hope Chigudu (I knew these three as being part of the team that gave us the Charter of Feminist Principles for African Feminists but had never met them) and the Ugandan Woman Achiever 2013,the incorrigible and lovable Dr. Hilda Tadria.

Then too, I would meet the women behind my meeting these other fantastic women, the AWDF team consisting of the soft-spoken but uncompromising (on feminist issues) Theo Sowa, convenor of all these amazing women Nafi Chinery, well-known Afro-sexuality blogger Nana Darkoa, and of course the aforementioned Sarah Mukasa.

My leadership, if I can be said to have any, is different from any of the women above and consists of much navel-gazing and compliment seeking on whether a word or phrase sounds right and yet, in the three days I never had a single moment of being an outsider looking in. It was amazing listening, learning, laughing, crying, comforting, sharing with all of them. Through being with them, I learnt some very important things that I should have known but did not know. I learnt that whatever successes one makes of whatever they are doing is not very useful if it isn’t communicated to the people who should know about it. As an example, we can set up mentorship programs for young women or set up a centre for abused women, a workshop for women writers but if we do not communicate the message to the people who it’s set out for; to the public among whom may be a sympathetic audience that may help out when needed then there is a degree of failure. And yes, too often while self-identifying as a feminist and talking of a feminist cause on this continent often leads to a hostile media within, there are ways to counter the hostility through proper messaging.

Equally important, I learnt that being a ‘strong African woman’ at the expense of my well-being is counter-revolutionary to the feminist movement. I learnt that it is okay to admit being tired. To ask for help and admit that I cannot do it all and most importantly, I am under no obligation to do it all. To quote Hope Chigudu, “after all, what are human rights if we are fragmented, have no support and are unhappy?”

On Monday 2^nd June 2014, I went into a room full of strangers, and left having met some people I know will be lifelong friends. And for those whose paths may not cross with mine again (why ever not?), I leave having learnt valuable lessons from each and every one. A major reason for this was that the group was small enough that in the course of the three days I got to chat with each of the women and found echoes of myself in many of them. As I reflect on the three days spent with the women I met at the CEO Forum, I happily admit that whatever it is I expected, what I experienced was beyond my expectation. If the coaching that many of these women will undertake in the next ten months is as successful as the three days I spent with them, the future of African women leadership and the African feminist movement is in good hands. Best wishes to the CEOs and Executive Directors taking part in the 10 month coaching program as a follow up to this forum on leadership, governance and communications.

By: Zukisiwa Wanner

Zukisiwa Wanner is a writer who was most recently recognised “…as one of the top 39 sub-Saharan African novelists under 40 writing in English, French, Portuguese or an African language.” Check out her blog

One of the issues raised time and time again by AWDF’s grantee partners during a recent monitoring visit to Nigeria was the need to prepare for the 2015 general elections. In the context of insecurity and domestic terrorism, women’s rights organisations working in the areas of governance, political participation and leadership stressed the importance of encouraging women to enter the formal party political spaces, and to participate fully in political leadership positions. AWDF’s partners are adamant that women’s political participation is necessary not just on the basis of equity, but also a requirement for a change in ‘the old boys system of politicking’.

Women Environmental Programme (WEP) is one of AWDF’s grantee partners working to increase women’s participation in politics. An update in WEP’s recent newsletter provided this update below:

To be part of decision making on critical issues that affect them, women must come out to participate in political processes such as registering and voting in elections and vying for political positions. Participation of women in politics is the way through which the voices of women can be enhanced and their inputs captured for development purposes.

Due to religious, cultural and other factors, the women in Zamfara State, North Western Nigeria do not participate fully in electoral processes. In 2011 general elections out of a total of 2088 candidates that contested within the North West region only 49 were women representing 2.3% and out of this number, only 3 women contested from Zamfara State.

Unimpressed with the low level of participation of women in political processes in Zamfara State, Women Environmental Programme (WEP) initiated an action on Capacity Building for Women in Electoral Process and Political Participation in the Build Up to 2015 Elections in Zamfara State, North West Nigeria.

This action supported by African Women Development Fund (AWDF) has the overall objective of increasing the level of women participation in politics and democratic governance in Zamfara State through awareness creation.

WEP has started raising awareness in the three (3) senatorial districts of the State on the need for women to participate in political processes. WEP targets men, women and the traditional leaders to talk them into allowing women come out to participate in electoral processes. WEP has also launched media campaigns on radio in the state to call for women participation in politics in Hausa language for easy communication. With this WEP anticipates an improvement in the turnout of women come 2015 general elections in Zamfara State.

The Executive Board of the African Women’s Development Fund (AWDF) is pleased to announce that in January 2013 Professor Sesae Mpuchane will take over as Chair of the Executive Board of AWDF. This follows the completion of two terms in office as Board Chair by Dr. Hilda Tadria, co founder of AWDF. The Board and staff of AWDF offer their sincere thanks to Dr Tadria for her six years of exemplary leadership in that role, and look forward to benefitting from her expertise as an ongoing member of our Executive Board.

Professor Sesae Mpuchane has been a member of AWDF’s Executive Board for 3 years, bringing her considerable experience in academia, science and fundraising to the work that AWDF does. She sees her work with AWDF as “an opportunity to be part of a network or movement that is committed to the full empowerment of women through the creation of an enabling environment for positive change” and cites AWDF as “one of the few organisations that scouts or explores for value in women, at all levels, brings that value to the fore and helps to make it grow and flourish. A caring organisation such as the AWDF can bring about much needed change to society”

Theo Sowa says, “ It has been my priviledge to work with a committed Executive Board under the leadership of Dr Hilda Tadria. I would like to take this opportunity to publicly thank Dr Tadria and all of AWDF’s Executive Board for their service to the organisation. I am pleased that Professor Sesae Mpuchane has accepted the nomination of her peers to take office as Board Chair. The whole AWDF team look forward to working with her in the service and achievement of African women’s rights”.

Click to read Professor Sesae’s bio